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Environmental laws are designed to reduce negative
externalities (such as pollution) that harm the natural world.
Copyright law should adjust the rights of content creators in order
to compensate for the ways they reduce the usefulness of the
information environment as a whole. Every new work created
contributes to the store of expression, but also makes it more difficult
to find whatever work one wants. "Search costs" have been well-
documented in information economics and addressed by trademark
law. Copyright law should take information overload externalities
like search costs into account in its treatment of alleged copyright
infringers whose work merely attempts to index, organize, categorize,
or review works by providing small samples of them. These
categorizers are not "'free riding" off the labor of copyright holders.
Rather, they are creating the navigational tools and filters that help
consumers make sense of the ocean of expression copyright holders
have created.
The new scholarship of cultural environmentalism lays the
groundwork for a better understanding of the costs, as well as the
benefits, of copyrighted expression. Any expression that signals
something to one who wants exposure to it may constitute noise to
thousands of others. By modeling information overload as an
externality imposed by copyrighted works generally, this article
attempts to provide a new economic justification for more favorable
legal treatment of categorizers, indexers, and reviewers. Information
overload is an unintended negative consequence of copyright law's
success in incentivizing the production and distribution of
expression. If courts grant content owners the right to veto
categorizers' efforts to make sense of given fields of expression, they
will only exacerbate the problem. Designed to promote the "progress
of the arts and sciences," copyright doctrine should privilege the
efforts of those who make that progress accessible and
understandable. Categorizers fill both those vital roles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What to read? or watch? or listen to? These are hard questions,
not because of any scarcity of expression, but rather because of its
abundance. Over 100,000 books are published in the United States
each year, thousands of movies and CDs are released, and the amount
of textual, musical, and visual works on the internet continues to rise
exponentially. Whose work can we trust? And who knows what of it
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will rank among the best that has been thought and said-or even
provide a few moments levity?1
Admittedly, a bulging bookshelf or surfeit of films prompts an
existential crisis in only the most sensitive souls. Most of us, most of
the time, drift along a well-trod path of filters and recommenders. The
New York Review of Books may be a trusted guide to "must-reads" (or
"must-avoids"). A favored movie or music critic might act as Beatrice
(or Virgil) in our daunting quest for information, entertainment, or a
fresh perspective on current events.2 As Richard Caves observed in his
classic analysis of the "creative industries," "buffs, buzz, and educated
tastes" are indispensable tools for making sense of the world of media
around us.3
Such tastemakers have become all the more important-and
varied-as content offerings proliferate. 4 They provide the metadata
(i.e., data about data) essential to finding the expression one wants. A
website such as "Rotten Tomatoes" can quickly aggregate reviews of a
movie and present them concisely. Amazon invites anyone to review
the books it sells. The iTunes music store posts customer reviews of
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall Law School. Many thanks to my hosts at the St. John's
University Distinguished Speakers Colloquium and the Seton Hall Law School Faculty Retreat
for giving me an opportunity to present on this topic. Erik Lillquist, Gaia Bernstein, Thomas
Healy, Marina Lao, Nelson Tebbe, Eric Goldman, Brett Frischmann, James Grimmelmann, and
Charles Sullivan provided valuable comments on the paper. I also wish to thank participants at
the May Gathering on Methodology in Legal Scholarship (at the University of Virginia) and the
Berkeley Intellectual Property Colloquium for their comments. The Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference of 2006 also provided an excellent venue for discussion; thanks to Greg
Lastowka, Mark Lemley, Trotter Hardy, and Ariel Katz for their astute comments after my
presentation. Thanks also to Mohammed Azeez, Dean Murray, Scott Sholder, and Matthew
Tuttle for excellent research assistance.
1. The purpose of criticism is to know "the best that is known and thought in the world."
Matthew Arnold, The Function of Criticism at the Present Time, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
ENGLISH LITERATURE 1408, 1417 (M. H. Abrams ed., 5th ed. 1986). Copyright law is one of the
most important legal tools for regulating culture in the United States. See Guy Pessach,
Copyright Law as Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of
Copyright's Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2003) (discussing how
"copyright regimes deal with cultural and political resources").
2. In The Divine Comedy, Beatrice, one of the blessed, sends Virgil to guide Dante through
Hell and Purgatory. Beatrice herself guides him in Heaven. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE
COMEDY, INFERNO, Canto 2, 11. 52-54, 136-42, at 37 (John Sinclair ed. & trans., Oxford University
Press 1961) (1308) (Virgil explaining to Dante, "a lady [Beatrice] called me, so blessed and so fair
that I begged her to command me").
3. RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE
177-80 (2000) (describing the gatekeeping role of various entities in recommending, and
discounting, works).
4. For accounts of the accelerating pace of digitization of data, see PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS
S. WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TRANSFORMS
STRATEGY 14 (2000); NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 5-6 (1995); DON TAPSCOTT, THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE AGE OF NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE 2 (1996).
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the podcasts it offers. Search engines complement all these efforts by
quickly assembling digital information regarding a query. 5
Such categorizers are on the verge of becoming even more
effective guides to online content; for example, as Google aims to index
books, and new technologies of sampling provide ever more
sophisticated ways for online reviewers to illustrate their posts and
podcasts. The rise of these metadata providers suggests that the
problem of information overload is beginning to solve itself. As more
and more services rate and organize content, there is less reason to
think one has missed some particularly compelling, delightful, or
important work.
Unfortunately, copyright litigation has begun to stifle this
development. Content owners are beginning to demand license fees
not merely for works themselves, but also for any fragments of them.6
The Motion Picture Association of America has already shut down a
site that illustrated the information it provided about movies with
trailers.7 Major publishers have sued Google, insisting that the search
engine license any "snippets" from books that it deems relevant to a
search query.8 A small search engine had to fight a long legal battle
merely to defend its practice of putting tiny, "thumbnail"
reproductions of an artist's landscapes in its database.9 Claiming
absolute rights over the content they own, many copyright holders
appear to demand nothing less than perfect control over any fragment
or sample of their works.
Many copyright theorists have documented how such fine-
grained control would threaten diversity in expression, 10 and perhaps
5. See infra Part IV.A (describing a more complete list of categorizers).
6. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus. the Sample Troll: The Shady One-Man Corporation
That's Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/ (discussing
the litigation campaign of Bridgeport Music Inc., which holds "portfolios of old rights (sometimes
accumulated in dubious fashion) and use[s] lawsuits to extort money from successful music
artists for routine sampling, no matter how minimal or unnoticeable").
7. See infra text accompanying notes 223-32 (discussing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003)).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 44-95 (discussing Google Print and Google Library).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 215-22 (discussing Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2003)).
10. Larry Lessig and Yochai Benkler have both documented the flood of creativity that new
computing technologies have helped unleash and proposed legal rules to protect such innovation.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6-8 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Free as
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414-29 (1999). Lastowka and Hunter's work has illustrated the extraordinary
importance of amateur production of content. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-
Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 951 (2004) (arguing that "the creation, selection,
production, dissemination, promotion, sale, and use of expressive content ... are undergoing
revolutionary decentralization and disintermediation ... [and] are increasingly being performed
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even copyright holders themselves.1 ' These theorists have closely tied
their encouragement of new creativity and "remix culture" to
proposals for copyright reform. In order to make the "raw material" of
innovation more available to "improvers" seeking to work with extant
innovation, 12 copyright reformers aim to reduce the scope, strength,
and duration of exclusive property rights in information. They have
offered a number of compelling justifications for their position. These
justifications focus on promoting innovation, diversifying content
providers, equalizing access, and the virtue-creating effects of
producing (as opposed to merely consuming) content.' 3
Unfortunately, most of these proposed justifications have not
been compelling to legislators or courts. Though lawmakers' rationales
for gradually strengthening copyright protection have been varied,
they boil down to a common perception that unlicensed uses amount
to free-riding. 14 "All this new creativity is great," leading copyright
by individuals and disaggregated groups" rather than large corporations, and furthermore that
the law should be "adjusted in order to recognize the opportunity and desirability of
decentralized content").
11. See Frank Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony's Contribution to the Fair
Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 777, 789, 795 (2005) (discussing how the failure of the film
industry's effort to outlaw the VCR--called the 'WTR" in the article-ultimately redounded to its
benefit, through the sale of video and DVDs); William Fisher, Don't Beat Them, Join Them, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A23 (claiming that trying to block technology that seems to infringe on
copyrights may result in the worst outcome for the copyright holder-the most beneficial result
occurs when the copyright holders are denied a share in the revenues earned by a new
technology and instead have to create their own commodity to complement the technology).
12. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1050 (1997) (a definition of improvers); id. at 1020-21 (noting that patent law
traditionally does a much better job of protecting improvers than copyright law, for example,
through the lack of doctrine analogous to "blocking patents" in copyright law); id. at 1023 ("In
the case of "improvers who have made a major contribution to social value, for example a work in
which the new material predominates over infringing material ... patent law offers the
possibility of complete immunity from infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
Copyright law has no corresponding doctrine.").
13. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 120-21 (2002) (praising "innovation from the internet"); Yochai Benkler &
Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 394, 394-95,
400 (2006), available at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum.
14. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1039 (2005) (documenting "courts and scholars ... preoccupied with the problem of 'free
riding.' "). As Lemley explains, "If the goal of creating property rights is to equate private and
social costs and benefits by having the property owner internalize the social costs and benefits,
those who 'free ride'--obtain a benefit from someone else's investment-are undermining the
goals of the property system." Id. at 1039-40.
If I plant beautiful flowers in my front lawn, I don't capture the full benefit of
those flowers-passers-by can enjoy them too. But property law doesn't give
me a right to track them down and charge them for the privilege-though
owners of property once tried unsuccessfully to obtain such a right.
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holders admit. "But why permit it at my expense? Why not get a
license like everyone else?" On this view, reductions of intellectual
property rights are takings, to be compensated like any other transfer
of property from private hands for public purposes.' 5 The copyright
holder is always an innocent victim who has contributed something
original to the store of knowledge, and those using any part of its work
without a license are unfairly refusing to pay for the unalloyed benefit
the work has conferred on society.' 6
How can this view be challenged? Some cyberlaw theorists
have argued that the social benefits of looser intellectual property
protections greatly outweigh the costs of reduced protection. 17 This
argument is likely true, but given valuation difficulties, it is hard to
Id. at 1048 (articulating a number of compelling reasons why law should not strive to internalize
all positive externalities of intellectual property to its owner).
15. U.S. courts have established that there can be a "taking" of trade secrets. Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) ("[T]o the extent that Monsanto has an interest in
its health, safety and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under
Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.");
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) ("In most states, trade secrets are
property protected by the Takings Clause ...."). The recent French decision limiting recent
legislation regarding iPods also suggested a takings rationale for preserving intellectual property
("IP") rights against legislative alteration. See, e.g., Thomas Crampton, Apple Gets French
Support in Music Compatibility Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C9 (describing the decision
from the French Constitutional Council to declare "major aspects of the so-called iPod law
unconstitutional . . . . 'highlight[ing] fundamental protections for intellectual property in such a
way as to put iTunes a little further from risk of the French law' "). Were such a rationale
adopted in the United States, the much-observed "ratchet effect" of IP expansionism would move
from empirical regularity to constitutionalized norm.
16. The Clinton Administration's White Paper on internet policy expressed this view, and it
has animated copyright policy in legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, which greatly expanded copyright holders' rights to control digital uses of their works.
Some participants have suggested that the United States is being divided
into a nation of information "haves" and "have nots" and that this could be
ameliorated by ensuring that the fair use defense is broadly generous in the
NII context. The Working Group rejects the notion that copyright owners
should be taxed-apart from all others-to facilitate the legitimate goal of
"universal access."
BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 84 (1995). This bizarre stance presumes that there
is some baseline price and set of rights that copyright owners are entitled to, outside of law.
Boyle has observed the fatuousness of the Working Group's assumption of a baseline of absolute
copyright holder control over expression. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 105-06 (1997) ("Of course, given the goals of
copyright law, it would have made just as much sense if the argument had been reversed, taking
the fair use rights of users and consumers as the baseline.").
17. Glynn Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975, 977-
78 (2002) ("Only where the copyright owner has demonstrated by the preponderance of the
evidence that the net benefit to society will be greater if a use is prohibited, should a court
conclude that a use is unfair." (footnote omitted)).
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prove its truth in the economic patois that now dominates intellectual
property policy.18 This Article proposes another tack, analogizing
information overload in the cultural environment to pollution of the
physical environment. 19
Environmental laws force polluters to pay for the ways they
reduce the usefulness of air, water, and soil. Information law should
adjust the rights of content creators in order to compensate for the
ways they reduce the usefulness of the information environment as a
whole. Every new work created contributes to the store of expression,
but also helps make it more difficult to find whatever work a
particular user needs or wants. The "search cost" of finding a needed
work has been well-documented in the literature of information
economics. 20 Copyright law should take negative externalities like
search costs into account in its treatment of alleged copyright
infringers whose work merely attempts to index, organize, categorize,
review, or provide small samples of work generally.21 They are not
simply "free riding" off the labor of copyright holders, but rather are
18. James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish?: Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2009 (2000) ('[Information economics]
offer[s] us plot-lines and econo-dramas, readymade images of types of dysfunction in information
markets that sharpen our perceptions of potential risks and benefits. Unfortunately, it tends to
offer them in antagonistic and mutually annihilating pairs."); Frank Pasquale, Toward an
Ecology of Intellectual Property: Lessons from Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright's
Commons, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 78, 84-85 (2006) (attempting to address some of the valuation
difficulties); see RIsHAB A. GHOSH, CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY, 275-76 (2005) (estimating the value of OSS with reference to the price of proprietary
software that accomplishes the same or similar functions).
19. Boyle, supra note 16, at 108-09 (pioneering this approach by recommending that
intellectual property law reformers learn from strategies adopted by environmentalist scholars
and activists). Several other scholars have extended and developed this metaphor. See, e.g., Brett
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 917, 980-81 (2005); Dennis D. Hirsch, Is Privacy Regulation the Environmental Law of the
Information Age?, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
CONVERSATION 239, 240 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Pasquale,
supra note 18; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2005).
20. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003) (discussing the "benefits of trademarks in reducing the
costs to consumers of distinguishing among brands of a product"). Although the authors
concentrate on trademark law, the point is generalizable to any situation where a given product,
information or otherwise, is being sought out by a potential purchaser or user.
21. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROC. 347, 350 (1967) ("[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.").
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creating the types of navigational tools and filters that help consumers
make sense of the ocean of data copyright holders have created. 22
By modeling information overload as an externality imposed by
copyrighted works, this article attempts to provide a new economic
justification for more favorable copyright treatment of a group of users
collectively deemed "categorizers." Though categorizing is but one
small part of what indexers, samplers, and search engines do, this
synecdochic designation participates in the very phenomenon it is
used to describe. For often the part is very revealing of the whole, and
categorizers' efforts to reveal the whole via samples and snippets
deserve far more solicitude from the law than they currently receive.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II describes how
conflicts between copyright holders and those who categorize their
content have complicated our understanding of fair use. The recent
suit against the "Google Print" project has crystallized the legal issues
at stake: 1) whether categorizers can provide small samples of
copyrighted works to illustrate the categorizations made, and 2)
whether a categorizer can copy an entire work digitally in order to
prepare such samples. 23 Though doctrines protecting fair use and
"intermediate copying" may protect such indexing activities, a series of
court decisions limiting fair use have made their applicability
questionable. Few areas of law are more unsettled.
Stepping back from the doctrine, Part III explains the role of
categorizers in the information ecosystem. While past legal
scholarship has celebrated categorizers' creativity and utility, this
Article focuses on information overload as a negative condition that
necessitates it. Just as the production of physical goods burdens the
natural environment, the production of copyrightable expression
imposes costs on the cultural environment. These information
overload externalities include the increased "search cost" of finding
the particular piece of expression one most wants, increased anxiety,
and loss of solidarity via a fragmented public sphere.
The classic economic response to physical pollution is a
"Pigouvian tax," designed to internalize the cost of emissions to their
source.24 Such a tax would be impossible in the cultural environment,
22. Pessach, supra note 1, at 1067 ("Recent scholarly work has emphasized copyright's
'dynamic effect,' that is, the ongoing influence of expansive copyright protection toward an
enclosure of the creative commons, and diminishment of cultural diversity.").
23. Elisabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10,
12-14 (suggesting that Google's book digitization and indexing projects may run afoul of current
copyright laws).
24. See Dennis W. Carlton & Glenn C. Loury, The Limitation of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-
Run Remedy for Externalities, 95 Q.J. ECON. 559, 559 (1980) (defining Pigouvian taxes as efforts
to internalize the costs of externalities to their creators, and discussing their disadvantages);
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because information overload is not an artifact of any particular act of
creation but rather of the creative process overall.25 The more practical
method of addressing information overload is to empower the
categorizers who can help us make sense of the "blooming, buzzing
confusion" of the information society.
Part IV proposes a way of adjusting copyright doctrine to
accomplish this goal. Because categorization projects are so necessary
to counteract the negative effects of information overload, they
deserve positive recognition in the first fair use factor, which focuses
on the "purpose and character of the use."26 Traditional analysis of
whether the use is commercial and transformative has extremely
limited utility in the categorization context. Courts can short-circuit
these endlessly manipulable formal distinctions by recognizing
categorization as a pro-defendant finding in the first fair use factor.
Courts should also immunize initial digital copies of works used for
generating such samples.
Information overload is an unintended but serious consequence
of copyright law's success in creating incentives for the production and
distribution of expression. If courts grant content owners the right to
veto categorizers' efforts to make sense of given fields of expression,
they will only exacerbate the problem. Designed to promote the
"progress of the science and useful arts,"27 copyright doctrine should
privilege the efforts of those who make that progress accessible and
understandable. Categorizers fill both those vital roles.
Pigou or No Pigou, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2006, at 85, 85, available at http://www.economist.
com/finance/displaystory.cfm?storyid=8150198 (describing new resurgence (and resistance to)
Pigou's ideas).
25. Moreover, the old adage that "one man's trash is another's treasure" is commonly
thought to be truer of cultural than physical products. BART KOSKO, NOISE 6 (Penguin Press
2006) ("One person's signal is another person's noise and vice versa."). I have resisted this sort of
relativism in some venues; I recognize it, however, as a persistent feature of what Rorty calls
postmodern bourgeois liberal democracy. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Pasquale to Prawfsblawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/is-bachbetter_.html (May 9, 2006, 12:42
EST); Frank Pasquale, The Strange Romance of IP Expansionism and Aesthetic Relativism,
MADISONIAN THEORY, Aug. 4, 2006, http://madisonian.net/archives/20O6/O8/04/the.strange-
romance-of-ip-expansionism-and-aesthetic-relativisml.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
[Vol. 60:1:135
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II. DILEMMAS OF CATEGORIZERS
Categorizers, reviewers, and indexers have existed for some
time. 28 But the legal questions they raise have become increasingly
urgent as new technologies advance their effectiveness. Without
digital technology, one could usually only find a book by subject if it
were so relevant to the search that the "subject" words in a card
catalog happened to match one's search. Now, digitized textual
searches can make the entire book a de facto index card. Before web
access, the only way to watch a film review actually illustrated by
clips was to watch Gene Shalit or some other noted reviewer with a
television show-which may in turn be owned by the financial backers
of the movies reviewed. Now there is no technological barrier to
reviewers putting up clips to illustrate graphically the picks and pans
they dish out.29
However, there are many legal barriers. Section 106 of the
Copyright Act grants copyright holders six exclusive rights-all of
which may be violated by the would-be reviewer. 30 Any copy of the film
28. See, e.g., JAMES F. ENGLISH, THE ECONOMY OF PRESTIGE: PRIZES, AWARDS, AND THE
CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL VALUE 1 (2005) (noting that the "custom of... selecting outstanding
individuals from various fields of cultural endeavor and presenting them with special tokens of
esteem ... dat[es] back at least to the Greek drama and arts competitions in the sixth century
B.C.... ").
29. Categorizers' political significance should also be recognized. Some commentators
believe heavily favored incumbent George Allen lost his 2006 senate race in Virginia after a clip
of him "belittling [a] dark-skinned man as 'macaca, or whatever his name is' " was rapidly
disseminated over the web. Frank Rich, 2006: The Year of the Macaca, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2006, § 4, at 12. Rich argues that "[t]he moment became a signature cultural event of the
political year because [Allen's opponent] posted the video clip on YouTube.com, [a] wildly popular
[video categorizing] site .... Unlike unedited bloggorhea, which can take longer to slog through
than Old Media print, YouTube is all video snippets all the time; the one-minute macaca clip
spread through the national body politic like a rabid virus." Id.
30. [T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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made in order to isolate the clips violates the owner's exclusive right
to copy. 31 The clip itself may be deemed a "derivative work, which only
the owner may prepare." 32 Placing it on a website may be termed
"distribution," or even a "public performance," depending on how
many individuals have access to the site.33 Even if the clip has no
negative impact on the market for the film, the copyright holder can
still sue for statutory damages-which range as high as $150,000 for a
willful infringement. 34
Regardless of these deterrents, thousands of individuals still
post and comment on movie clips, texts, music, images, and other
copyrighted works. 35 To the extent they comment on the original, they
have a decent shot at a "fair use" defense. 36 Fair use is copyright's
"safety valve," permitting a wide range of uses unauthorized by
copyright holders.37 To the extent the user's commentary is more
31. See id. § 106(1) (granting the copyright owner exclusive reproductive rights, making
such copying an infringement).
32. Id. § 106(2) (codifying the exclusive right to prepare a derivative work based on a
copyrighted work).
A 'derivative work' is [defined as] a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.'
Id. § 101.
33. Id. § 106(3) (codifying the "distribution" right); id. § 106(4) (codifying the "public
performance" right).
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory
damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one
work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two
or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than
$750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.
Id. § 504(c)(1); id. § 504(c)(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.").
35. See Posting of Daniel J. Solove to Concurring Opinions Blog, http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/12/what-if.copyrig.html (Dec. 15, 2005, 11:53 EST)
("[The blogosphere has developed a set of copyright norms in an area where there is very little
enforcement. These norms about the use of copyrighted material are probably at odds with
existing copyright law.").
36 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
37. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) ( "[The 'fair use' defense allows the
public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself
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voluminous than the clip or sample involved, the fair use defense is
stronger.38
But as automated categorizers, such as search engines, have
begun to enter the field, the limits of fair use are being tested. Search
engines' ranking of cached content in response to a search inquiry is a
"comment" on the content; as one court recently held, rankings may be
considered a form of expression protected under the First
Amendment. 39 Nevertheless, a wide array of content owners-ranging
from book publishers to sports broadcasters to news services-have
complained that Google's initial copy of their content into its
databases, and its subsequent provision of fragments of that content
in response to search queries, is a violation of their copyrights.
Given the paucity of comment they offer, search engines pose
the copyright issues raised by categorizers in the starkest form.40 A
long review encompassing a small film clip would strike many as a
classic fair use (though the law of fair use is so unclear that even that
conclusion cannot be made with certainty). 41 But if a categorizer's only
contribution consists of organizing and ranking content, should that
excuse an infringement of copyright?42
in certain circumstances.... The fair use defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship
and comment." (citation omitted)).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (calibrating the fair use defense to the "amount and
substantiality" of the work used).
39. Two questions remain. First, are PageRanks constitutionally protected opinions?
Second, if PageRanks fall within the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment, is the
publication of PageRanks per se lawful under Oklahoma law, thereby precluding tort liability
premised on the intentional and even malicious manipulation of PageRanks by Google? The
court answers both questions in the affirmative. Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-
02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). For a critique of Search King's
First Amendment analysis, see Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Fairness and Accountability in
the Law of Search, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
40. In this respect, the dilemmas facing search engines and bond raters raise similar First
Amendment issues. See Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the
World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
411, 427 (1990). In a fair use dispute, the search engine would likely call its ranking system a
type of "editorializing" or comment on the items ranked and organized. However, it is unclear
whether ranking in itself is "transformative" enough a use to merit a favorable fair use finding,
or even a positive "first factor" finding.
41. See, e.g., Preamble, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN
FAIR USE (Am. Univ. Ctr. for Soc. Media, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 18, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair use-final.pdf ("[D]ocumentary filmmakers
have found themselves, over the last decade, increasingly constrained by demands to clear rights
for copyrighted material.... The knowledge and perspectives that documentarians can provide
are compromised by their need to select only the material that copyright holders approve and
make available at reasonable prices.").
42. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 777,
779-80 (2006) (discussing the nature of the ranking in connection with the Search King case). In
Search King, Google successfully resisted an action sounding in defamation and unfair
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As the rest of Part II demonstrates, that legal question is
deeply contested. Since the search engine Google is now directly
confronting legal challenges usually only hypothetically posed to
categorizers, I focus the discussion on it. The Author's Guild, major
publishers, and Agence France-Press have all claimed Google's current
and planned services infringe their copyrights. 43 The rest of this Part
examines the strength of each side's claims, setting up a discussion in
Part III regarding which side deserves to be vindicated.
A. Case Study: The Google Print Project
Sergey Brin has said that "the perfect search engine would be
like the mind of God."44 Hubris aside, the comment reveals much
about the aspirations of general purpose search engines. Their
business model is predicated on their being the first source of
information that "searchers" seek out when they need to find a site for
which they do not know a URL, or any other resource they cannot
locate by themselves. Searchers will only trust a given search engine
as an all-purpose portal if they can be reasonably assured that it has
indexed the relevant information. If, for example, you are searching
for "resorts near Cancun," and you know that a given search engine
only lists American sites, you would be sure to avoid that one.45
competition by characterizing its page rankings as "opinion" rather than "fact." 2003 WL
21464568, at *3. While I am wary of giving search engine rankings First Amendment protection
in this way, I think that rankings contain enough expressive content to merit favorable copyright
treatment analogous to that already enjoyed by reviewers.
43. Complaint at 2, The Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed
Sept. 20, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs
/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf (alleging that "[b]y reproducing for itself a copy of those works
that are not in the public domain... Google is engaging in massive copyright infringement.");
Complaint at 5, Agence France-Press v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05cv00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17,
2005) (on file with author), available at http://blog.searchenginewatch. comlblog/050321-175410
(follow 'Main Document (Complaint)" hyperlink) (alleging that "[w]ithout AFP's authorization,
Defendant is continuously and willfully reproducing and publicly displaying AFP's photographs,
headlines and story leads on its Google News web pages.").
44. Siva Vaidhyanathan, A Risky Gamble with Google, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 2, 2005,
at B9; see Documentary Archive: Inside the World of Google (BBC News television broadcast Aug.
15, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/documentary-archive/4794479.stm
(follow "Download" hyperlink; fast-forward audio to 16:43) (Susan Wojcicki, VP of Product
Management, confirming Brin's perhaps facetious statement about his interest in a "Google
implant to the brain" which would act as a search engine, allowing access to the world's
information-although "no one is working on that right now").
45. China adopts an analogous policy, having constructed "what is known in academic
circles as the Great Firewall of China," which keeps government-censored sites from reaching its
citizens. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF
BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 204 (2005).
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Although the Cancun example is fanciful (given the
international reach of the main general-purpose search engines
operating in the United States), it does highlight the importance of
comprehensiveness to a search engine. 46 For some time, search engines
have jockeyed to claim that they have indexed the most websites. 47
Nevertheless, search engines have also conceded to individual site-
owners' demands by not indexing sites that have a small programming
script ("robots.txt") at the top of the "source pages."48 This opt-out
strategy has worked well in the online context because the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act immunizes "information service providers"
from copyright liability for caching websites. 49
Similar express immunities do not apply to books, but Google
has nevertheless attempted to apply this opt-out approach to the texts
it is indexing for its "Google Library" project. The quest for
comprehensiveness has taken search engines beyond online sources
and into the print world; all the major general-purpose search engines
have begun scanning books into an online database. 50 However, only
Google is committed to copying copyrighted books into a database and
making them searchable. 51 (In time, searches for "resorts near
Cancun" might not just generate links to relevant websites, but also to
snippets of text from relevant books like Fodor's Mexico.) Google is
permitting copyright owners to keep their books out of the database,
provided they notify Google of their objections. 52 This "opt-out"
46. Danny Sullivan, End Of Size Wars? Google Says Most Comprehensive But Drops Home
Page Count, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Sept. 27, 2005, http://searchenginewatch.com
/searchday/article.php/3551586.
47. Id.
48. See generally Google.com, Removing My Content from the Google Index,
http://www.google.com/webmasters/remove.html (follow "How can I remove content from Google's
index?" link; then follow "Remove" hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 4, 2006) (representative of the
policies of other large general-purpose search engines).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2006).
50. Elinor Mills, Microsoft to Offer Book Search, CNET, Oct. 25, 2005, http://news.com.
com/Microsoft+to+offer+book+searchl2100-1025_3-5913711.html.
51. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Google Adds Library Texts to Search Database, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 2005, at Cl.
52. See Oren Bracha, Abstract, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of
Everything and the Many Faces of Property (Univ. of Texas Law and Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 92, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=931426
(using "the Google Print Library case in order to examine the role of opt-out arrangements in
copyright law in general and in the context of digital libraries in particular" and "argu[ing] that
the choice between opt-in and opt-out is always a context-specific policy determination and that
the digital-library context makes a compelling case for an opt-out regime.").
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approach has provoked the ire of the Author's Guild and major
publishers, who have sued to enjoin the Google project. 53
Google has partnered with five major libraries in order to build
a massive digital library based on their holdings.54 To date, the
University of Michigan, Harvard University, Stanford University, the
New York Public Library, and Oxford University have agreed to
participate. 55 Each library partner has control over which of its books
are scanned, and each is to receive a copy of the books pursuant to
conditions specified in its contract with Google. 56 Google plans to add
over fifteen million library volumes to its electronic index (and is
expected to spend $150 million (approximately $10 per book) in
compiling its digital library).57 Users will be able to enter a search
term and receive a results list of everywhere that term appears in
Google's database. 58
53. Google knew or should have known that the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
101 et seq. ("the Act") required it to obtain authorization from the holders of
the copyrights in these literary works before creating and reproducing digital
copies of the Works for its own commercial use and for the use of others.
Despite this knowledge, Google has unlawfully reproduced the Works and
has announced plans to reproduce and display the Works without the
copyright holders' authorization. Google intends to derive revenue from this
program by attracting more viewers and advertisers to its site.
Complaint at 2-3, The Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
20, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf.
54. See Vaidhyanathan, supra note 44, at B7 ("The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
has agreed to let Google scan its entire collection-some 7.8 million works-and Stanford
University says it is keeping open the possibility of including 'potentially millions' of its more
than eight million volumes.").
55. Wyatt, supra note 51; see, e.g., Contract between Google Inc., and the Regents of the
University of Michigan 1 (on file with author), available at http://lib.umich.edu/mdp/um-google-
cooperative-agreement.pdf. The Author's Guild is not only concerned about Google's copy of the
libraries' holdings, but also with the digital copy they plan to give to each of the libraries. At the
Yale Search Conference, Author's Guild representative Paul Aiken fretted that universities
might be so bold as to permit libraries to make course reserve readings available online. Paul
Aiken, Address at the Yale Information Society Project Conference: Regulating Search? A
Symposium on Search Engines, Law, and Public Policy (Dec. 3, 2005). Given the coursepack
cases discussed below, Mr. Aiken likely has a legal basis for demanding compensation for such a
use.
56. See Posting of Susan Wojcicki to Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com
/2005/09/google-print-and-authors-guild.html (Sept. 20, 2005, 21:04 EST).
57. Compare John Markoff & Edward Wyatt, Google is Adding Major Libraries to its
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al, with Gary Wolf, The Great Library of Amazonia, 11
WIRED 76 (2003), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l1/12/amazon-pr.html
(describing the process of creating Amazon's "Look-Inside-The-Book" feature and the costs of
digitization associated with it).
58. Even the project's critics acknowledge the enormous gains in access to knowledge the
project promises. See Vaidhyanathan, supra note 44, at B10 ("The dream of a perfect research
machine seems almost within our reach. Google ... announced late last year that it would
digitize millions of bound books from five major English-language libraries. It plans to make
148
2007] TOWARD THE PRIVILEGING OF CATEGORIZERS
Google has set forth different terms of distribution for the
materials that will be included in Google Print, depending on their
copyright status. Materials in the public domain will basically be
made wholly available. If a page from a public domain work contains a
search term entered by a user, she will be able to view the entire page
that contains the search term and can also read through or print the
entire book.
Copyright owners can also make their books available in this
way, but very few have chosen to do so.59 More likely, a copyright
owner submitting a work to Google Print will choose Google's second
distribution option: to permit a searcher to view a full page of the text
surrounding their search results and also a few pages on either side of
the results. The result page will also provide links to online book
retailers who sell the text.
For copyrighted works not recommended to Google by their
publisher, a far more constricted result will appear. The user will only
be able to view the bibliographic information and a few short
sentences of text around their search term.60 The results page will
provide links to other information on the web regarding the search
terms, links to retailers who sell the book (or used book sellers in case
the work is out-of print), and a link suggesting places to find the book
at the user's local library.61 In addition, "[t]o further protect the
copyright holders, Google disables the user's print, save, cut and copy
functions on the text display pages so that the user is limited to
reading the information on the screen."62
available online the full text of public-domain books (generally those published before 1923, plus
government works and others never under copyright) and excerpts from works still in
copyright."). These new technologies promise to transform many information-related industries.
See, e.g., Deanna Barmakian, Better Search Engines for Law, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 399 (2000).
59. See, e.g., Larry Lessig, Free Culture, http://www.free-culture.cc/ (providing a PDF of the
book, information on where to buy a paper copy, reviews, a wiki, and audio versions). Though
this strategy may not maximize revenues for a copyright holder, there are clear advantages for
an author trying to disseminate ideas. See Podcast: Interview by Frank Ling with Larry Lessig,
hosted by Berkeley Groks Science (Apr. 28, 2004), http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu
/-franklBerkeleyGroksLessig.htm (describing near-instantaneous creation of audio-version,
wiki-version, and translations of the book after it was made available online).
60. See Google, What You'll See When You Search on Google Book Search, http://
print.google.com/googleprint/screenshots.html#excerpt (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (explaining that
"The Snippet View, like a card catalog, shows information about the book plus a few snippets-a
few sentences of your search term in context.").
61. Id. ("These links aren't paid for by those sites, nor does Google or any library benefit if
you buy something from one of these retailers .... To enforce limits on how many pages a user
can view, we do connect some information-your Google Account name-with the books and
pages that you've viewed.").
62. Hanratty, supra note 23, at 12.
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B. Indeterminate Legal Analysis
Nevertheless, Google's project has provoked objections from
leading copyright holders and raises two important issues for
copyright law. First, courts must decide whether the initial archival
copy, necessary to the creation of the index, violates copyright law.
Second, the status of whatever "snippets" the search engine generates
in response to search inquiries is also at issue. The plaintiffs want
Google to license each of these uses; Google claims each is a fair use.
The following statutory text of § 107 governs the controversy:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [enumerating copyright
holders' rights], the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 6 3
A rather complicated caselaw has developed around each
factor. Sections 1 and 2 below analyze how each might apply to the
two stages of the Google Print project.64
63. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Eric Goldman, Summary of Fair Use Doctrine (Oct.
2004), http://www.ericgoldman.org/Courses/ipsurvey/fairusecheatsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2006) (providing a rough guide on how these factors usually play out in the caselaw).
64. I have split the analysis into the two stages of the project, but even this initial step is
contestable. While the entire searchable database of Google Library may be deemed a
"transformative" use of the works involved, there is no guarantee that a court will focus on that
stage of the process. It may well focus on the initial, archival copies Google makes, and deem
those "nontransformative." A first factor finding that this essential aspect of the Google Library
project is both commercial and nontransformative would seriously undermine any fair use
defense Google might have. On the other hand, a court may elide the "initial archival copying"
analysis by deeming that incidental or intermediate copying. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006)
(providing that it is not infringement for the owner of a machine to make a copy of a computer
program if the copy is made automatically by virtue of the activation of a machine that contains
a licensed copy of the computer program, for repair and maintenance purposes); see also Sega
Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Where disassembly is the
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer
program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use
of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law."). For a critical look at the applicability of these
cases here, see discussion infra note 257.
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1. The Initial Archival or Indexed Copy
To create a searchable database of books, Google first needs to
scan each paper book into a digital file. Only a complete copy can serve
the tool's purpose: to permit every word of every text to be a search
query. Generally speaking, the first fair use factor (relating to the
"purpose and character of the use") has two dimensions: commerciality
and transformativity. 65 Noncommercial uses are favored, as are those
that add to, revise, or reconfigure the work.66 An archival copy itself
serves no commercial purpose-only the result it generates does.
However, archival copies do not have transformative qualities; their
very purpose is to reproduce faithfully the content they index. So the
first fair use factor appears to be a "wash."
Inquiries into the second fair use factor, the "nature" of the
copyrighted work, usually have two prongs as well-first, whether the
work is fact or fiction,67 and second, whether the work is published or
unpublished.68 Courts are usually less concerned about unauthorized
uses of factual works and published works than they are about
unauthorized uses of fictional works and unpublished works, and they
adjust fair use jurisprudence accordingly. Thus, it appears that this
factor slightly favors Google: though some of the books are fictional,
some are factual, and all are published.
The third fair use factor, "amount and substantiality," cuts
against Google, since Google plans to copy each work in its entirety. 69
Finally, the fourth fair use factor-the effect on the market-is
entirely indeterminate. 70 A court might find that Google's failure to
65. In the last Supreme Court case addressing fair use, the Court suggested that
transformativity analysis is more important than commerciality analysis. Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ('The central purpose of [first factor analysis] is to
see ... whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative.'" (internal citations omitted)).
66. Id.
67. The copying of factual works, including factual elements of creative works (such as the
tables of contents and indexes) is likely to be deemed fair use. See, e.g., Harper & Row,
Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
68. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 504-48 (2d ed. 1995)
(providing an overview of how courts have treated various uses under the second factor).
69. Copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use unless mitigating
circumstances are found. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
However, making a copy of a television program for home viewing at a later time entails copying
the entirety of a creative work but has been found to be fair use. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-51 (1984).
70. Jonathan Band's analysis suggests that Google has a better chance at "winning" this
factor than is suggested here. See Jonathan Band, Google: Google Print: Dismissing Copyright
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pay licensing fees for the right to archive the books is a grievous
financial loss to the copyright holders.71 Or a court might find that
such a licensing market is not "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed,"' 72 and that the archival copies, standing alone, pose no
threat to the commercial interests of copyright holders. 73 Given the
equivocal nature of the other three factors, the futility of the fourth
factor's analysis makes fair use analysis of the initial archival copies a
black box.74
Concerns, 7 E-COMMERCE L. & POL'Y 8 (2005), http://www.ecomlaw.conlp/detailscontents.asp
?ID=967 ("Without question, the Print Library Project will increase the demand for some books.
The project will expose users to books containing desired information, which will lead some users
to purchase the books or seek them out in libraries (which in turn may purchase more copies of
books in high demand). It is hard to imagine how the Library Project could actually harm the
market for certain books, given the limited amount of text a user will be able to view.") Band also
reasons that the "Google Publisher" option offered to copyright holders (which provides them a
share of any advertising revenue generated by the project) would circumvent the licensing
demands mentioned below. Id.
71. The reasoning is obviously circular:
[A] potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always been supplanted in every fair
use case, to the extent that the defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of
plaintiffs work, which use could in turn be defined in terms of the relevant potential
market. In other words, it is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of
a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing
the very use at bar.
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A)(4) (Matthew Bender
& Company, Inc. 2006) (1963). Nevertheless, it has guided a number of leading fair use decisions.
See Pasquale, supra note 11, at 777 (cataloging and criticizing such decisions as directly
contradicting the Supreme Court's method of fourth factor analysis exemplified in Sony v.
Universal Studios).
72. This is the legal standard for determining the legitimacy of licensing evidence in fourth
factor analysis. See Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1168-69 (2000).
73. See Band, supra note 70 ("Without question, the Print Library Project will increase the
demand for some books. The project will expose users to books containing desired information,
which will lead some users to purchase the books or seek them out in libraries (which in turn
may purchase more copies of books in high demand). It is hard to imagine how the Library
Project could actually harm the market for certain books, given the limited amount of text a user
will be able to view."). Band also reasons that the "Google Publisher" option offered to copyright
holders would circumvent the licensing demands mentioned below. I provide doctrinal support
for Band's broad reading of fourth factor, "effect on the market" analysis in a recent article. See
Pasquale, supra note 11, at 790. Nevertheless, a strict application of rules developed in the
coursepack cases would suggest that publishers could still claim a negative market effect because
a fair use finding would deny them the chance to charge a licensing fee for snippets.
74. This should not be surprising; as David Nimmer has suggested, "had Congress
legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright
Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same." David Nimmer, 'Fairest of Them All' and
Other Fair Use Fairy Tales, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003); see also MARJORIE
HEINS & TRIcIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT
CONTROL 16-25 (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.
pdf (discussing various focus groups' and lawyers' complete uncertainty about whether certain
uses of copyrighted work would count as fair).
2007] TOWARD THE PRIVILEGING OF CATEGORIZERS
Since there is no direct precedent for Google's service, it is
difficult to apply caselaw here. Some commentators have argued that
Google's archival, indexed copies are prohibited under a 2000 district
court opinion, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.75 In that case, a
company with an apparently forward-looking business model,
MP3.com, copied 80,000 CDs in order to permit users who could prove
they already owned certain CDs to "space-shift" their content-i.e.,
listen to streamed music via MP3.com's website, rather than lugging
around their CDs. 76 The district court rejected every aspect of
MP3.com's fair use defense, a decision that ultimately led to a
settlement of $53.4 million in damages paid to Universal Music
Group. 77
MP3.com stands as a chilling landmark of copyright
formalism. 78 For instance, the Recording Industry Association of
America has used MP3.com-like reasoning to argue that owners of
CDs have no right to rip them onto their personal MP3 players.
Though the RIAA has long held the position that "it's perfectly lawful
to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your computer, put
it onto your iPod," it and other large content holders recently made it
clear that they believe they can revoke that right at any time and for
any reason:
Nor does the fact that permission to make a copy in particular circumstances is often or
even routinely granted necessarily establish that the copying is a fair use when the
copyright owner withholds that authorization. [A policy permitting copies is] simply a
statement about authorization, not about fair use.
79
If content owners succeed in preventing iPod owners from ripping
their own music to their own personal music players, it is hard to
imagine Google achieving the right to copy content en masse.
This is true, unless, of course, courts overcome the formalism of
MP3.com and look at the initial copy in the context of Google's larger
75. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See
Hanratty, supra note 23, at 10.
76. MP3.com would stream the music to the user once they had validated their ownership of
the relevant CD. UMG, 92 F.Supp 2d at 350.
77. Amy Harmon, Deal Settles Suit Against MP3.com, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at C1.
78. For the leading contemporary jurisprudential definition of formalism, see Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (defining formalism as "the way in which rules
achieve their 'ruleness' [by] ... screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive
decisionmaker would otherwise take into account"). The fair use test codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107
is more a standard than a rule, left deliberately open-ended in order to permit contextual
judgment to trump mechanical pigeonholing of cases. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
79. Joint Reply Comments to the United States Copyright Office on DMCA Rulemaking on
Exemptions to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, Docket No. RM 2005-11 (Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. et al. Feb. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/ lmetalitzAAP.pdf.
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purposes in creating an index of books. Both courts and Congress have
recognized the legitimacy of intermediate copying in contexts where a
spare copy was necessary to a non-infringing goal.80 For example,
computer repairers can make an identical but non-infringing copy of a
program on a hard drive to perform maintenance,8 1 and programmers
can make a non-infringing copy of a program in order to reverse
engineer it. 2
2. Snippets
An intermediate copying, fair use defense can only succeed if
the final product-a database providing "snippets" as samples of
books-is non-infringing. This is an extraordinarily difficult question
in copyright law.8 3 Google has argued that the snippets are a fair use
80. Paul Ganley, Abstract, Google Book Search: Fair Use, Fair Dealing and the Case for
Intermediary Copying (Jan. 13, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRNID875384_code549519.pdfabstractid=875384&mirid=1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2006)
(proposing, based on American law, a "specific defence for 'intermediary' copying premised on the
'temporary copies' exception.. . of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988 ... and
alternatively a new defence of 'fair dealing for informational purposes'...."); compare ROBERT
BURRELL AND ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 136 (2005) ("The
libraries and archives [exemptions in the United Kingdom copyright law] allow officially
sanctioned persons to make copies of a work and, in appropriate circumstances, to supply these
copies to other institutions and individuals ... ").
81. In 1993, the Ninth Circuit refused to find a repairman's unauthorized "copying' of a
program to a computer's hard drive a fair use, despite the necessity of doing so merely to turn
the computer on. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). Five years
later, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 legislatively overruled that part of the
holding. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c)(2006) (providing that it is not infringement for the owner of a
machine to make a copy of a computer program if the copy is made automatically by virtue of the
activation of a machine that contains a licensed copy of the computer program, for repair and
maintenance purposes).
82. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Where
disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a
copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.") Beyond that bright line
rule, Sega may well also stand for a judicial willingness to permit copying of small portions of
competitor's software in order to promote interoperability. Id.
83. Unfortunately, the formalism of the statutory fair use factors makes much of the
analysis of the initial archival copy planned by Google applicable to the "snippets" that search
queries would generate. The fourth factor licensing analysis is indeterminate, and the second,
"nature of the work" query is slightly in Google's favor, given the published status of all the
works. The third factor shifts to Google's favor, since the "snippets" are only a tiny fraction of the
work as a whole (generally, the three or four lines above and below the search term). The first
factor may shift to Google's favor as well, since the generation of snippets is far more
transformative than the mere copying of texts. Yet the commercial dimensions of the project are
far more evident here, since Google will be selling advertising on pages that feature the snippets.
So the first factor, and brute fair use analysis generally, appears indeterminate here as well. For
a commentary on the formalism and ultimate incoherence of the factors, see Michael Madison, A
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of the books from which they derive. But copyright holders may argue
that the snippets themselves are copyrighted works.8 4 Consider a
query for "poetry about plums" that returns an anthology by William
Carlos Williams. The entire twenty-eight word poem, This Is Just To
Say, might show up as a snippet.85 It is hard to argue against the
conclusion that this snippet is a reproduction of copyrighted work.
Though such a result might merely lead one to exclude short
poetry from the digitized databases, run-of-the-mill protection of
"microworks" raises other problems.8 6 Though "[wiords and short
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans" clearly are not
copyrightable,8 7 clever advocacy has eroded extant judicial resistance
to the copyrightability of abridgments, samples, or small portions of
works.88
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1550 (2004) (describing
"conflicts and complications in the statutory text" that govern fair use determinations).
84. Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575,
576 (2005) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2000)) ('The Copyright Act defines a 'collective work,' a
'work made for hire,' 'literary works,' a 'joint work,' and 'a work of visual art.' But the law runs
silent on the foundational concept on which these definitions are built."). Hughes notes that
[u]nder the fair use doctrine, the smaller the amount copied, the fairer the
copying. Courts have also deployed a 'de minimis' copying rule separate
from, and antecedent to, any fair use analysis. The de minimis rule expressly
allows the copying of small and insignificant portions of the plaintiffs work.
However, neither of these doctrines is an adequate device because each takes
the work as its starting point to measure the amount of copying.
Id. Many courts have been unwilling to reject claims for control of very small "works." See, e.g.,
Thomas Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 333 n.3 (2005) (citing Mattel, Inc. v.
Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 134-37 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that "the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a judgment that Barbie's eyes, nose, and mouth
were uncopyrightable standard features")).
85. The entire poem is twenty-eight words long. See William Carlos Williams, "This Is Just
To Say," quoted in its entirety in CAMILLE PAGLIA, BREAK, BLOW, BURN 131 (Pantheon Books
2005) (apologizing for finishing off the cold plums in the refrigerator).
86. I borrow the term "microworks" from Hughes. Hughes, supra note 84, at 576.
87. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2006) (providing that that "[w]ords and short phrases such as
names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic
ornamentation, lettering or coloring; [and] mere listing of ingredients or contents" are not subject
to copyright).
88. See Hughes, supra note 84, at 577 (observing that the "creeping protection of
'microworks' " occurs primarily because fair use and de minimis doctrine (permitting the copying
of small portions of plaintiffs' work) "each takeo the work as its starting point to measure the
amount of copying," leaving open the possibility that the court will define the work narrowly and
characterize the plaintiff as copying the whole of it). A similar issue is known as the
"denominator problem" in takings law; as the Supreme Court acknowledged,
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been
taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical
questions is determining how to define the unit of property "whose value is to furnish
the denominator of the fraction."
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Under the fair use doctrine, it usually is the case that the less
of a work is copied, the more likely the use is fair.8 9 However, the
fourth "effect on the market" component of fair use cases has
sometimes devolved into a judicial insistence that any use that can be
paid for, should be paid for.90 The "coursepack" cases, for instance,
required that instructors at universities get copyright permission for
reproducing portions of books in materials photocopied for classes.9 1
On one reading, these cases require a copier to license any portion of a
work for which a market is 'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed." 92 Given the extent to which the internet reduces the
transaction costs of micropayment systems,93 publishers might argue
that a new branch of the extant Copyright Clearance Center would
easily set up a marketplace for snippets.9 4 Mere token efforts by
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedectis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Frank
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (calibrating fair use protection to "amount and
substantiality ' of the work used). But see L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d
1119, 1120-23 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that even taking a small portion of the work may lead to a
negative third factor finding if it is the "heart of the work"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Pagliarina
Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (E.D. Va. 1997) (reaching a similar conclusion). See also L.A.
News Serv. v. Reuters Telev. Int'l, 149 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 1998) (mentioning the "heart of
the work" doctrine); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 1998) (same).
90. See Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor
Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2002) (criticizing this development as a misinterpretation of
her seminal article on the topic, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601
(1982) (asserting that "the courts and Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market")).
91. See, e.g., Bernard Zidar, Fair Use and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops
Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1364 (1997) (suggesting
that the "prevailing analysis by which fair use is determined effectively denies fair use protection
to all commercial copyshops").
92. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1407-08 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994)).
93. Micropayments are "small digital payments of between a quarter and a fraction of a
penny." Posting of Clay Shirky, clay@shirky.com, to nec@shirky.com (Sept. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.shirky.comlwritings/fame-vsfortune.html. Internet services like BitPass,
FirstVirtual, Cybercoin, Millicent, Digicash, Internet Dollar, and Pay2See have served as
micropayment systems. Id.
94. For example, in Princeton, the Sixth Circuit ruled that publishers' development of the
Copyright Clearance Center made it reasonable for them to demand that universities license
even brief excerpts of copyrighted works included in coursepacks. See, e.g., Princeton, 99 F.3d at
1386-87 (holding that defendant's photocopying of plaintiffs copyrighted work was not a fair use
because it harmed the reasonable potential market value of the copyrighted works); Am.
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930-31 (same). For a complete collection of documents relating to
the coursepack case, see Stanford University Libraries, Copyright and Fair Use: Michigan
Document Services and Coursepacks, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/primary-materials/cases/
michigan.document services/index.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). This site is one excellent
example of the value of the work of "legal categorizers" on the internet.
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copyright holders to set up a licensing market for "snippets," then,
could fatally undermine Google's argument for unlicensed use. And
many publishers have made more than token efforts, brokering deals
with Amazon's similar "Look Inside the Book" program (though they
have refused to disclose the terms of the deal).95
Those unfamiliar with copyright arcana might find it odd that
the mere ability to charge for snippets should have anything to do
with a legal requirement to do so. 96 As Gideon Parchomovsky argues,
[T]he ability to charge by itself cannot possibly determine legal rights. A hoodlum might
have the ability to charge protection fees, and yet no one would argue that this in itself
gives him a right to do that .... Absent an underlying theory of rights, the ability to
charge is normatively meaningless.
9 7
Given the utilitarian contours of U.S. copyright law, 98 content
owners try to supply such an "underlying theory" by arguing that the
better they perfect their control over the use of their works, the better
they can maximize the development of future works.99  Their
opponents, known variously as the Open Access Movement, 100 Free
95. Wolf, supra note 57, at 76 (Amazon "created an unrivaled digital archive of more than
120,000 books" by "negotiat[ing] contracts with hundreds of publishers."). Google aims to digitize
millions of titles held by five major university libraries, and argues that given the millions of
"orphan works" (with no clear copyright ownership) and the unreasonableness of some
publishers, there is no way to attain a comprehensive index via negotiations.
96. As I have expressed elsewhere, I think that both MP3.com and Princeton Univ. Press
are misguided as a matter of copyright policy, ultimately undermining the constitutional purpose
of intellectual property protection. See Pasquale supra note 11, at 781. There is no sound
economic rationale for taking the position that every use (outside a narrow band of "classic" fair
uses) that can be paid for should be paid for. Id.
97. Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY
347, 360 (1997).
98. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 146-48 (rev. ed. 2003) (contrasting utilitarian American approach to copyright with
natural rights perspective that is more common internationally).
99. June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan
Center for Law, Media, and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 385, 496 (2004) (finding that
"Section 1201 has been successful in stimulating new means of distribution and promoting
consumer choices with respect to a variety of works, particularly sound recordings, motion
pictures and television programming, and literary works"); Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of
Technological Measures, Protecting Works of Authorship; International Obligations and the US
Experience, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 11, 12 (2005) (stating that "[t]he US experience to date
indicates that legal protection for technological measures has helped foster new business models
that make works available to the public at a variety of price points and enjoyment options,
without engendering the 'digital lockup' and other copyright owner abuses that many had
feared").
100. Public Library of Science: Open Access, http://www.plos.org/oa/definition.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2006) (defining open access publications as those for which "[t]he author(s) and
copyright holder(s) grant(s) to all users a free, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access
to, and a license to copy, use, distribute, transmit and display the work publicly and to make and
distribute derivative works, in any digital medium for any responsible purpose, subject to proper
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Culture Movement, 1°1 or the Copyleft, 10 2 argue that such a strategy
tends only to enrich dominant players, and that an alternative, more
open-access policy, would maximize expression.103
This Article takes a different normative tack in advocating for
copyright reform. Instead of arguing that more access to works for
categorizers would increase the amount and quality of expression, I
take the position that such a policy would reduce the costs of
information overload generated by the abundance of works. I expand
and develop my critique of cases like MP3.com and Princeton
University Press in Parts III and IV below. The view that "every use
that can be paid for, should be paid for" is parasitic on an assumption
that every copyrighted work somehow contributes positively to the
store of expression. As our understanding of information overload
externalities grows, such an assumption is becoming increasingly
naive.
III. FROM MAXIMIZING TO OPTIMIZING EXPRESSION
Copyright law not only might permit content owners to scuttle
search engines' quest for an authoritative index of copyrighted
expression, but also may chill the efforts of smaller categorizers who
want to sample works for illustrative purposes. This result is
unacceptable in an age of data proliferation, as metadata becomes an
ever more important resource. 0 4 Some balance is needed before
attribution of authorship, as well as the right to make small numbers of printed copies for their
personal use.").
101. See FreeCulture.org: Manifesto, http://freeculture.org/manifesto.php (last visited Nov. 7,
2006) ("We won't allow the content industry to cling to obsolete modes of distribution through
bad legislation. We will be active participants in a free culture of connectivity and production,
made possible as it never was before by the Internet and digital technology, and we will fight to
prevent this new potential from being locked down by corporate and legislative control.").
102. Copyleft, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) ("Copyleft is a general
method for making a program or other work free, and requiring all modified and extended
versions of the program to be free as well."). The copyleft tries to assure that open access versions
of software remain open access by trying to require any future users and developers of such
software to make their products open access as well. Id.
103. See, e.g., HENRY C. MITCHELL, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 137 (2005) (decrying dominant role of content industries in setting
policies and arguing for the restoration of "user rights and social utility as factors in IP
regimes").
104. As David Weinberger comments on the Google Print controversy, "Despite the present
focus on who owns the digitized content of books, the more critical battle for readers will be over
how we manage the information about that content-information that's known technically as
metadata." David Weinberger, Crunching the Metadata, BOST. GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2005, at E3. For
a definition of metadata, see Metadata, in WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERMM]
metadata.html ("Metadata describes how and when and by whom a particular set of data was
collected, and how the data is formatted."). For a broader definition, see Metadata, in WIKIPEDIA,
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aggressive litigation strategies permit content owners to leverage
control over copyrighted works into veto power over any project that
ranks, reviews, organizes, or even refers to them. 10 5
Unfortunately, extant academic commentary on copyright
tends to obscure the importance of categorizers by elevating the value
of all copyrighted work indiscriminately. Section A below explores this
rhetoric, concluding that normative discourse on copyright needs to
balance accounts of how to maximize expression with frank
recognition of expression's costs. Section B suggests one way of
recognizing expression's costs, by analogizing the problem of
information overload to pollution in the environmental context. If
copyright holders insist on characterizing robust fair use exceptions as
a "tax" or "taking" of potential licensing fees, it is just as appropriate
to characterize those exceptions as compensation to society for the
information overload they have helped create.
A. The Maximizing Paradigm
Full accounting for information overload externalities would
balance any putative sacrifice in licensing fees that fair use for
categorizers would cause. Unfortunately, current normative discourse
on copyright tends to occlude this possibility. Scholars on both sides of
copyright disputes generally assume that more expression is always
better-that copyright's constitutional purpose (to promote the
progress of the arts and sciences) is primarily about the creation of
incentives for expression. 106 Copyright expansionists point to the
incentive effects of increased legal protection of works.10 7 Promoters of
an expansive public domain claim that perfect control by extant
owners will excessively raise the cost of the "raw materials" used in
future information creation and thereby prevent more expression than
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMetadata (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). I am aware that the
"wikipedia" is not an authoritative source, but its treatments of technical subjects are sufficiently
clear and reliable to stand here as a placeholder for a later, stabler source of definitions.
Moreover, to the extent they reflect current public understanding of terms, they may well prove
superior to dictionary definitions written long ago.
105. An anticommons develops when fragmented ownership causes high transaction costs
that stunt the development of a resource. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). Just as Garrett
Hardin observed that insufficient propertization could lead to overuse of resources, anticommons
theorists show how excessive propertization can lead to underuse of resources.
106. Ginsburg, supra note 99, at 37 ("The technological measures that reinforce legal control
may enable and encourage authorial entrepreneurship, because authors may be able to rely on
these measures to secure the distribution of and payment for their works, and new business
models may therefore emerge.").
107. Id.
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such control promotes.108 Such assumptions, which tend to ignore or
downplay the costs of expression, unfairly disadvantage categorizers
in the normative debates surrounding their uses of copyrighted work.
Much scholarship in copyright can be characterized as an effort
to reconcile the curiously dual roles of copyrighted expression in
market economies. The entire field of intellectual property is premised
on the idea that the commodification of information will create
incentives for its production. However, one of the aspirational
conditions of any market is "perfect information;" i.e., consumers' and
producers' full knowledge of the utility of products.10 9 To the extent
such information is protected by copyright law, it is less than
universally available. The conflict is particularly acute in the sale and
licensing of copyrightable expression, an "experience good" whose
value often cannot be fully ascertained without some exposure to it.
Costless exposure to the product can often substitute for the product
itself-an insight formalized as Arrow's "paradox of disclosure."' 10
Another janiform role of information in the economy lies in its
status as both "finished good" and "raw material" for future
creation.111 Legal rules that raise the price for, say, copyrighted
musical lyrics, may incentivize more lyricists, but ultimately raise the
price of recordings. For this reason, the recording industry has long
(and successfully) lobbied Congress compulsorily to license musical
lyrics and compositions at a low, flat rate.112 Of course, the industry is
108. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 37 (Harvard University Press 1996) ("[Plerfect information is one of the
elements of the perfect market. If information can be commodified, then a host of transaction
costs are introduced into information flow and a limited monopoly is granted in the midst of a
system supposedly premised on competition.").
109. George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 239, 244 (Avery Weiner Katz
ed., 1998); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO LAW 234, 239 (Avery Weiner Katz ed., 1998); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information, in
THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2002),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Information.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) ('Many of the
central theories and principles in economics are based on assumptions about perfect
information."). For the legal implications of this assumption, see BOYLE, supra note 108, at 99
("Barriers to the free flow of information lead to the inhibition of innovation and inadequate
circulation of information.").
110. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (Kenneth Arrow ed., Princeton
University Press 1962).
111. BOYLE, supra note 108, at 38 ("[O]ne important use of'fair use' law is to make sure that
future creators have available to them an adequate supply of raw materials.").
112. See Theresa Bevilacqua, Time to Say Good-Bye to Madonna's American Pie: Why
Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 285, 285
(2001) (noting that "anyone who desires can make an arrangement of an existing work, record
the arrangement, and sell it"); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004).
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considerably less willing to recognize that its own music is "raw
material" for DJs, filmmakers, and other creative workers. 113
Many scholars have tried to develop proposals that reduce the
"commodification/perfect information" and the "finished good/raw
material" tensions. 1 4  Reliance on information economics has
enhanced the validity of this work generally over the past two
decades. However, the verdict of information economics is frequently
equivocal in particular disputes, given the two tensions discussed
above. Two schools-the "copyleft" and "copyright expansionists"-
have each developed rival prescriptions for maximizing expression in
the midst of these tensions.
Scholars and policymakers who favor expanding copyright
protections also draw on analogies between real and intellectual
property. The most famous is the tragedy of the commons. Just as a
common pasture may be overused if the entire community can use it
to graze its cattle, so too unowned or "orphan" works might be mis- or
over-used.11 5 Similarly, potential investors will balk at committing
resources to a project whose benefits they cannot reliably and
exclusively appropriate or sell. Just as private ownership of land has
proven to be an engine of economic growth,1 16 private ownership of
copyrightable works is the key to their development.11 7 Thus,
113. Joel Rose, Copyright Laws Severely Limit the Availability of Music, All Things
Considered, (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 9, 2006) (reporting on Library of Congress study
indicating that "over 70 percent of American music recorded before 1965 is not legally available
in the United States."). According to a recent report on the "clearance culture," "In the music
industry, the practice of requiring a license for even the smallest sample is entrenched." HEINS &
BECKLES, supra note 74, at 5. The contrast with the recording industry's own treatment of
composers and lyricists could not be more stark. Bevilacqua, supra note 112, at 296 ("The RIAA
[has] argued the compulsory license [for lyrics and compositions has] to be retained because the
threat of an industry-wide monopoly might resurface if authors were allowed to grant exclusive
licenses.").
114. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 144-145 (Stanford University Press 2004) (recommending
compulsory licensing scheme for all works); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988).
115. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
116. HERNANDO DESOTO, THE OTHER PATH (Basic Books 1990) (theorizing secure private
ownership of land as the linchpin of economic development). But see John Gravois, The DeSoto
Delusion, SLATE, Jan. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112792/ ("In some corners of the world,
the land-titling programs inspired by de Soto's work are proving merely ineffective. In other
places, they are showing themselves to be downright harmful to the poor people they set out to
help.").
117. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 487 (2003) (arguing that untrammeled copying or use of a celebrity's image
"could prematurely exhaust the celebrity's commercial value ... just as unlimited drilling from a
common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely"). But see Stewart Sterk,
Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U.
L. Q. 417, 421 (2005) ("Real property rights operate to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons'-a
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expansionists argue that intellectual property ("IP") laws should
expand the scope and term of IP rights, and grant rights of control
over earlier stages of the development of information goods.118
A number of critical IP scholars have attempted to refute these
models by emphasizing the benefits of more open access to works.11 9
The Free Culture movement has countered each of these contentions
with arguments that limits on "real world" property rights should be
extended to IP.120 Scholars have developed theories of the "tragedy of
the anticommons" 121 or "comedy of the commons." 122 They argue that
an open-access regime, or "low IP equilibrium," can be far more
productive than a situation where early innovators "lock up" certain
fields and initiate escalating arms races toward acquiring more and
more IP rights. 123
Despite their opposing conclusions on most particulars,
scholars in favor of open access share some common assumptions with
copyright expansionists. Both schools emphasize that the decision to
problem that does not arise with intellectual works because once created, those works, unlike
land, are non-rivalrous public goods.").
118. See Ginsburg, supra note 99, at 12; Bruce Kuhlik & Richard Epstein, Is There a
Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54 (answering no).
119. See Posting of Donna Wentworth to Copyfight Blog, http://copyfight.corante.com/
archives2005/0730/ whatdoescopyfightmean.php (July 30, 2005) ("[T]he copyfight is the
battle to keep intellectual property tethered to its purpose, understanding that when IP rights
are pushed too far, they can end up doing exactly the opposite of what they're intended to do.").
The Copyfight blog has a long list of "copyfighters" on the left side of the page. Id.
120. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (2004) (arguing that "property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to be,"
surveying "fifty doctrines of property law," "distilling restrictions centered on development,
necessity, and equity" from these restrictions, and "import[ing] these categories of limits into"
intellectual property law).
121. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 441 (2003) ("Anticommons property occurs when multiple parties have an
effective right to prevent others from using a given resource, and as a result no one has an
effective right of use."); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research
Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 141 (2004) (arguing that fragmented intellectual property rights hamstring innovation).
But see Kuhlik & Epstein, supra note 118, at 54 ("Without ample patent protection, no
combination of first-mover advantages or altruism will generate the capital sums needed.
Reducing the patentees' right to exclude or its power to price is a partial repeal of the patent
grant with mischievous social consequences.").
122. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON
WEALTH 37-38 (Routledge 2002) (celebrating the nonrivalry of consumption of information
resources); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713 (1986) ("There is... an extensive academic and judicial
discussion of the possibility that certain kinds of property ought to be public.").
123. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=878401 (arguing that the fashion industry's
"low-IP equilibrium" promotes innovation).
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make any particular stage of intellectual property production
commodifiable will draw investment to that stage, while diverting
resources away from earlier or later stages. For example, if very short,
basic sequences of programming code are copyrightable, software
firms would invest a great deal in developing (and copyrighting) those
sequences. If only larger structures (or collections) of code are
copyrightable, then investment is shifted toward those structures.
Copyright expansionists tend to argue that commodification should be
permitted at earlier stages of production, since competition in
"innovation markets" is often for, and not within, a market. 124 The
Free Culture movement tends to argue that only later stages of
production should be commodifiable, in order to ensure that a larger
"public domain" of materials is open for everyone's use and
development.
Neither side tends to acknowledge the costs of producing ever
more copyrightable expression, or to investigate deeply the quality
and kind of expression produced. 125 However, some scholars have
hinted at recognizing this problem by applying environmental
economics as a way of balancing the competing roles of information in
the market. Rather than maximizing resource yield, environmental
law frequently focuses on optimizing it in order to preserve a robust
natural ecosystem. 126 Similar insights are beginning to inform a new
movement of "cultural environmentalism" aimed at improving the
quality, diversity, and organization of copyrighted expression.
B. An Ecology of Expression
Environmental economists try to balance the commodification
of environmental resources with their importance as a general
124. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 569, 574 (1995)
(suggesting a "causal connection between market concentration and the pace of technological
innovation"). But see Robert Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles, 64
ANTITRUST L. J. 49 (1995).
125. Here copyright may find some guidance from patent scholarship's recent concern with
patent quality. See, e.g., BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN'T USE 2-3 (Brookings Institution Press
2006) (suggesting that many pharmaceutical patents ought to be given better treatment than
many software patents, since the former are often based on far more costly research); Mark
Lemley, Doug Lichtman, & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?, REGULATION,
Winter 2005-2006, at 12-13 (proposing a method of identifying and increasing legal protection for
particularly useful patents).
126. See, e.g., H. Gary Knight, International Fisheries Management: A Background Paper, in
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 1, 41 n.25, 2, 23 (H. Gary Knight ed.,
1975) ("Optimum sustainable yield was established as the international management criterion
for fisheries in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas.").
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"background" in which all other activity (including market exchange)
takes place. 127 The valuation of ecosystem services helps quantify the
monetary value of this "background" role by estimating the full costs
of pollution.1 28 For example, the "harvest" of many natural resources
not only results in a finished product (such as a fish to eat), but also
short-circuits that resource's capacity to yield more in the future (i.e.,
the eaten fish is not going to spawn).1 29 Environmental economists
have given us a much more sophisticated understanding of the trade-
offs between commodification and preservation regimes.1 30
There have been many instructive translations of these ideas
from the physical to the virtual realm. For example, Brett Frischmann
emphasizes the analogies between information goods and physical
infrastructures that enable markets to function.131 James Boyle's work
similarly elevates open access to certain types of information as a sine
qua non for successful markets. 3 2 Elinor Ostrom has applied her
landmark work on physical commons to the information commons.1 33
These scholars argue that information goods, like wetlands or forests,
tend to produce many positive externalities undervalued by
markets. 134
127. HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS 89-90 (Island Press 1991) ("Benefits and
costs that do not register themselves as conscious short-run pleasure or pain at an individual
level but that are organic, with interdependencies far exceeding market relationships, must be
dealt with outside the market and must result in constraints on the market.").
128. EBAN S. GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 32 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2005) ("Economists define 'pollution' as a negative externality: a cost of a transaction not borne
by the buyer or seller. Pollution is termed an externality because it imposes costs on people who
are 'external' to the transaction between the producer and consumer of the polluting product.").
129. Id. at 41 (observing that "free-market forces do not provide the right incentives to insure
that adequate precautions are taken to protect our environment").
130. Knight, supra note 126, at 22-23.
131. Frischmann, supra note 19, at 985-90.
132. Boyle, supra note 16, at 113. A "Conference on Cultural Environmentalism" at Stanford
is set to revisit Boyle's contribution in March 2006. Cultural Environmentalism at 10,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/conferences/cultural/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) ("host[ing] a
symposium to explore the development and expansion of the metaphor of 'cultural
environmentalism' over the course of ten busy years for intellectual property law").
133. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a
Common Pool Resource, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 113 (2003) ("summariz[ing] the lessons
learned from a large body of international, interdisciplinary research on common-pool resources
in the past twenty-five years and consider[ing] its usefulness in the analysis of scholarly
information as a resource").
134. See also Mark Lemley & Brett Frischmann, Spillovers 34 (Stanford Law and Economics,
Working Paper No. 321, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=898881 (discussing positive externalities); Pasquale, supra note 18, at 78 (arguing
that the positive complementary, network, and long-range effects of new technologies on the
value of copyrighted works parallel the indirect, direct, and option values of biodiversity recently
recognized by environmental economists). For a definition of positive externalities, see William
B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class
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Building on this work, Yochai Benkler provides a particularly
powerful theoretical account of the beneficial role of categorizers on
the web in the course of addressing the "Babel objection" to internet
communications. 135 Under this account of information overload, "when
everyone can speak, no one can be heard, and we devolve either to a
cacophony or to the reemergence of money as the distinguishing factor
between statements that are heard and those that wallow in
obscurity."136 According to Benkler, the "emergence of nonmarket,
peer-produced alternative sources of filtration and accreditation in
place of the market-based alternatives" is one key response "to the
information overload problem." 137 Benkler notes that an institutional
ecology of "enclosure" threatens such categorization processes, just as
an ecology of "openness" is key to their success. 138
The new scholarship of cultural environmentalism sets the
groundwork for a better understanding of the costs, as well as the
benefits, of copyrighted expression. Any particular consumer good is
both a finished product, potentially useful to some consumer, and
potential trash, distracting the attention of shoppers from what they
really want or need, or cluttering landfills of the future. 139 Similarly,
any bit of expression that signals something to one who wants
exposure to it may constitute noise to thousands of others. It is as
foolish to hope for the maximization of copyrighted expression as it is
to measure our welfare merely with reference to the amount of stuff
we have. 140
After developing the pollution analogy further, I make the case
for considering information overload as an externality below.
Characterizing information overload as an externality advances legal
Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710 n.6 (2006) (defining an externality as "a cost or benefit that
the voluntary actions of one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without
their consent").
135. YocHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 10 (Yale Univ. Press 2006), available at
http://www.benkler.org/BenklerWealthOfNetworks.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 395.
139. JAMES R. KAHN, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES 251, 254 (The Dryden Press 1995) (demonstrating that "we are generating an
inefficiently high level of waste" because "the private cost of solid waste does not equal its social
cost"). But see Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming).
My response to Goldman is posted as a commentary to Conglomerate Blog Junior Scholars'
Workshop, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/07/frank pasquale_.html (July 5, 2006).
140. See Grossly Distorted Picture: It's High Time that Economists Looked at More than Just
GDP, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2005, at 72, available at http://www.economist.com/finance/
PrinterFriendly.cfm?storyid=5504103 ("GDP... was never intended to be the definitive
yardstick of economic welfare... [and] is not even the best gauge of the monetary aspects of living
standards.").
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recognition of the benefits of fair use for categorizers in two ways.
First, the externality approach denies copyright holders the rhetorical
high ground cultivated by victims of eminent domain. 141 Fair use is
less an easement or taking forced on an innocent party to facilitate
some utopian ideal of information dissemination, than a natural way
of "cleaning up" the mess of expression encouraged by copyright
law. 142 Second, the externality approach reframes economically and
neutrally a perspective often consigned to the dustbin of cultural and
ideological critique. Dominant IP policymakers may be frightened of a
"Free Culture" movement, but they cannot shun the very economic
methods originally used to justify strong copyright protection once
they render more nuanced policy recommendations.
1. Information Overload as Externality
Nuisance claims, anti-pollution laws, and taxation are all
methods of "internalizing" the cost of harms like pollution to their
creators. In his 1997 book Data Smog, David Shenk noticed that many
producers of information were, like producers of physical goods,
causing an externality: a miasmic haze of "information overload" that
threatened to obscure the truth of any given matter in a cacophony of
conflicting claims. 143 As early as 1991 James Boyle had noted the
trend on a larger scale, calling for some "future Pigou [to] write an
analysis of the. . . 'information pollution' we were creating...
[because] our economics did not force us to internalize the
consequences of our overproduction."'' 44 Answering Boyle's call, this
Article recognizes information overload externalities and proposes
141. This rhetorical high ground is very effective in current efforts to limit eminent domain
powers. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at
Al ("In a rare display of unanimity that cuts across partisan and geographic lines, lawmakers in
virtually every statehouse across the country are advancing bills and constitutional amendments
to limit use of the government's power of eminent domain to seize private property for economic
development purposes."); Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (to Public), N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2006, § 4, at 3.
142. Gregory Duhl provides a good comparison of fair use and eminent domain that confirms
these points in Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use
Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 730 (2004) (arguing that "courts
[should] account for a copyright holder's lost licensing royalties in its analysis of market effect
only if a primary or derivative market for licensing the original work exists, and only if the
copyright holder is willing and able to exploit that market").
143. DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG 11 (HarperEdge 1997) (condensing a variety of social
scientific observations into thirteen "laws of data smog").
144. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1537-38 (1992).
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methods for courts to adjust copyright doctrine in order to help
internalize them.1 45
Though few can doubt that information overload is an annoying
or troubling aspect of modern culture, a skeptic may still question its
characterization as an externality. A narrow economic approach may
reserve the concept of externality for more concrete or quantifiable
harms, dismissing an "overload externality" as excessively
subjective.'46 On the other end of the methodological spectrum,
humanists may find the positivism implicit in externality analysis
suspect, insisting instead that the critiques of overload relate to the
kind of society we hope to create, rather than harms to individuals we
hope to minimize. Though both the positivist individualism of
orthodox economics and the normative holism of critical cultural
studies might appear to pose obstacles to an externality-based
understanding of information overload, they ultimately illuminate the
externality concept's potential to unite these two ways of thinking.
147
An economics without an understanding of how individualized
transactions affect society as a whole is blind, but social criticism left
untranslated into the economic language of policy science is lame. 48
As empirical methods begin to complement (or even displace)
mathematical modeling in economics, 149  the field is becoming
145. There was an early recognition of the problem of overload in Ira S. Nathenson, Internet
Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
43, 48 (1998) (recognizing a "fundamental tension.., among the public, webmasters, and those
with proprietary rights, because each seeks to externalize its costs of information dissemination
and retrieval"). Nathenson's article, along with many later pieces on spam, recognized the harms
that could be caused by excess marketing of works. This Article focuses on information overload
attributable to works themselves.
146. Compare Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/
jec/creativityandculture.pdf ("[T]he purported advantage of rights theories and economic theories
is neither precisely that they are normative nor precisely that they are scientific, but that they
do normative work in a scientific way.").
147. I use the term "cultural studies" broadly to refer to all aspects of sociology, history,
anthropology, political science, and social science generally which are not committed to the
methodological individualism of economics. For more on the distinction between methodological
individualism and holism, see Ernest Gellner, Holism versus Individualism, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 254 (May Brodbeck ed., 1968).
148. This formulation follows Einstein's famous observation about science and religion
("Religion without science is blind; science without religion is lame."). See QuoteWorld,
http://quoteworld.org/quotes/4186.
149. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1570-74 (1998); Tanina
Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and
Economics Movement, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 973, 973 (2000). These trends suggest that small
communities of expertise are driving progress in economics, and the social sciences generally. See
IAN SHAPIRO, THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 14 (Princeton University Press
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1:135
increasingly relevant as it models competition and value-creation in
specific realms of human experience.150 Just as the fields of chemistry,
biology, and physics arose from "natural philosophy,"1 5 1 today the
fields of information economics, labor economics, behavioral
economics, and health economics are developing in response to
shortcomings in conventional microeconomic theory. 152 Two of the
most important new challenges to conventional microeconomic theory
are a) a growing recognition of the degree to which individual
consumption decisions influence others' capacity to consume and
produce1 53 and b) the development of hermeneutical economics based
less on quantification and modeling than on sophisticated
interpretations of the meaning of economic exchanges for those
participating in them.154
2005) (encouraging social scientists to "confront the complexities implicit in the relational logics
of... ideals").
150. See David Colander et al., Introduction to THE CHANGING FACE OF ECONOMICS:
CONVERSATIONS WITH CUTTING EDGE ECONOMISTS 18 (David Colander et al. eds., 2004) (noting
that "experimental economics is changing the way economists think about empirical work[,]" and
"ecological economics is redefining how nature and the economy are viewed as interrelating").
151. "[Natural philosophy is] the study of nature and the physical universe before the advent
of modern science." Natural Philosophy, http://www.answers.comltopidnatural-philosophy; see
also C.J. DIJKSTERHUIS, THE MECHANIZATION OF THE WORLD PICTURE 3 (Princeton University
Press 1986); JOHN DUPRE, THE DISORDER OF THINGS: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
DISUNITY OF SCIENCE 7 (1995) (criticizing reductionism as philosophically naive because "the
dream of an ultimate and unified science is a mere pipe dream"); BERNARD PULLMAN, THE ATOM
IN THE HISTORY OF HUMAN THOUGHT 12 (Oxford University Press 2001) (describing persistent
lure of reductionist thought).
152. For example, there are now distinctions between mainstream, orthodox, and heterodox
economists. See Colander et al., Preface to THE CHANGING FACE OF ECONOMICS, supra note 150,
at 8-9. Anita Bernstein has noted (with some skepticism) the resulting pluralism in Law and
Economics scholarship in Whatever Happened to Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 307-08
(2005) ("Stripped of its distinctive intellectual features, no longer able to give descriptions or
policy recommendations that could not have come from sources outside the movement, law and
economics now functions mainly as a faculty club with opaque, arbitrary criteria for
membership.").
153. See JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 106
(M.I.T. Press 1999) (discussing "emotions as the object of social norms"); OZ SHY, THE
ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 3 (Cambridge University Press 2001) (discussing how the
"utility derived from the consumption of [many] goods is affected by the number of other people
using similar or compatible products").
154. See, e.g., TYLER COWEN, GOOD AND PLENTY: THE CREATIVE SUCCESSES OF AMERICAN
ARTS FUNDING 131 (Princeton University Press 2006) (examining the meaning of copyright
enforcement to critics and consumers); DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, IF YOU'RE SO SMART 108
(University of Chicago Press 1992); Lawrence A. Berger, Self-Interpretation, Attention, and
Language, in ECONOMICS AND HERMENEUTICS 281 (Don Lavoie ed. 1990) (arguing that
"economics must come to grips with the questions of communication, community, and public
space.... [and] self-interpretation; for it is constitutive of the object of concern"); Warren
Samuels, Introduction to ECONOMICS AS DISCOURSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE OF
ECONOMISTS 5 (Warren Samuels, ed., Kluwer Academy Publishers, 1991) ('The paramount
status of meaning is the case whether economic reality is given in the senses that the
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Consider the role of millions of pounds of used computers
dumped into landfills in lesser-developed countries over the past
decade. 155  The computers contain various heavy metals and
contaminants that frequently pollute groundwater. 156 Degradation of
natural resources via pollution is a classic example of a negative
externality: A concrete harm (the dirt or damage caused by pollution)
is being inflicted by one group on another without compensation. 157 To
be sure, the burdens of information overload are less concrete than
those of pollution. 158 Yet the harms information overload imposes,
simply in terms of making sought-after information harder to find, are
real:
[I]n a Babel of signals, we must listen to a great deal of chatter to hear one bit of
information we really want. We discover that information can become noiselike when it
is irrelevant or interferes with desired signals, so tending to defeat meaning-making it
harder to extract meaning from information, just as it is hard to extract metal from low-
grade ore. 
15 9
philosophical realist and idealist affirm or is a matter of social, human construction; or whether
one follows the road of epistemology or rhetoric-discourse."); Gavin Wright, Economic History as
a Cure for Economics, in SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL
SCIENCE 41, 42 (Joan Scott and Debra Keates eds., 2001).
155. ELIZABETH GROSSMAN, HIGH TECH TRASH: DIGITAL DEVICES, HIDDEN TOXICS, AND
HUMAN HEALTH 7 (Island Press 2006); Jim Puckett, High-Tech's Dirty Little Secret: The
Economics and Ethics of the Electronic Waste Trade, in CHALLENGING THE CHIP: LABOR RIGHTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 225, 227 (Ted Smith et al.
eds., 2006) ("Free trade became a mechanism that allowed [hazardous materials] to be shunted
to unsuspecting, disempowered communities."); Press Release, Basel Action Network, High-Tech
Toxic Trash Exported to Africa (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/
press772.htm ("[A] report entitled The Digital Dump: Exporting High-Tech Re-use and Abuse to
Africa, exposes the ugly underbelly of what is thought to be an escalating global trade in toxic,
obsolete, discarded computers and other e-scrap collected in North America and Europe and sent
to developing countries by waste brokers and so-called recyclers.").
156. GROSSMAN, supra note 155, at 7.
157. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 109 (Princeton University Press
2000).
158. But note that even the latter are usually considered probabilistic harms, expressed as
some odds that one exposed to pollution will develop a disease in response. See Lisa Heinzerling,
The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 189 (2000) (discussing probabilistic
harms and cost-benefit analysis).
159. ORRIN KLAPP, OVERLOAD AND BOREDOM 2 (Greenwood Press 1986); see also BART
KOSKO, NOISE (Viking 2006) (discussing the prevalence and harms of noise). Low-income
internet users are probably the worst affected by overload externalities. Commenting on the
spam problem, Ray Everett-Church posits,
[W]hereas major corporations can afford to fight these cutting-edge cyberlaw battles,
small mom-and-pop ISPs and their customers are left to suffer the floods. The harm
inflicted is in many respects analogous to the effects on society from something like
pollution. For example, it would be far cheaper for chemical manufacturers to dump
their waste into rivers and lakes. However, those externalities-as economists call
them-allow one party to profit at another's--or everyone's-expense.
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Or, one might say, clean water from increasingly polluted
aquifers. Given the directness of the analogy, it should not be
surprising that mainstream economic theorists recognize the costs of
information excess. For example, Landes and Posner note that "the
demand for copies of a given work depends not only on the number of
copies but also on the number of competing works. The more there are,
the lower will be the demand for any given work. 1 60 Expression does
not exist in a vacuum, but rather influences and is influenced by
previous and expected expression.
A skeptic might object that these mutual influences are too
various or tenuous to be identified scientifically. However, as Donald
Herzog observes, "the criteria economists actually use to identify
externalities ... come from moral and political theory, not their own
views about utility maximization."' 16 1 This is a long and accepted
practice in the field of law and economics, permitting serious
consideration of, say, smoking or jackhammer noise as nuisances, but
not considering unusually colorful clothing or disagreeable manners to
be nuisances. Economists developed the concept of "externality" when
it became apparent that many aspects of the production of physical
goods either used or despoiled resources that the goods' producers
never paid for.
Despite the inevitably normative dimension of externality
labeling and measurement in economics, it is still widely accepted as
an integral part of a neutral and universalistic language of policy
justification. This is important because First Amendment concerns for
content neutrality may scuttle "first-order" efforts to deal with
information overload directly by making certain types of expression
more costly.162  Though courts have accepted many copyright
Ray Everett-Church, Why Spain is a Problem, E-OTI, May/June 1999, http://www.isoc.org/oti
articles/0599/everett.html.
160. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 39. Posner has also applied a broad understanding
of externalities in cultural disputes. See Posting of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/07/ (July 17, 2005; 19:19 EST) ("Economics
focuses on the consequences of social action.... Where is no difference from an economic
standpoint between physical and emotional harm; either one lowers the utility of the harmed
person.'). But see Richard Epstein, Externalities Everywhere? Morals and the Police Power, 21
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1997) (warning against overly expansive conception of
externalities).
161. Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895, 910, 912 (2000)
(book review) ("[E]conomists are opportunistic about invoking externalities. They do so not
whenever we find people with preferences about others' preferences and actions; they actually do
so in ways closely tracking the traditional harm principle of liberal theory.").
162. A first-order response to the problem-reducing legal incentives to create information-
would require one to "take sides" in the debate between the copyleft and IP expansionists
mentioned above. Ironically, it would tend to support the policy prescriptions of the loser (i.e., if
we finally decided that copyright expansionists had proven that privatization is the best method
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enforcement actions that suppressed expression, they are unlikely to
countenance an effort to use copyright policy to reduce trivial, untrue,
or immoral expression.163 However, understanding information
overload as an externality arising from information production could
lead to content-neutral policy prescriptions acceptable to all. This
understanding is focused merely on the amount, and not the kind, of
information produced, leading to "second-order" solutions to overload
externalities.
2. Reducing Search Costs: Copyright at the School of Trademark
We can further familiarize the idea of modeling information
overload as an externality by turning to an area of intellectual
property law well acquainted with the problem of search costs:
trademark law.164 In the blooming, buzzing confusion of modern
markets, trademarks are source-designators, 165 providing consumers
for maximizing information, we'd be inclined to endorse more forms of public access-and vice
versa). I am not prepared to take sides on this "first order" question here; suffice it to say, a great
deal more empirical research is necessary to such a determination, which would likely only be
valid for particular sectors of the information economy, and not for copyrightable expression as a
whole. For more on sectoral analysis in copyright, see Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The
Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, A Review of Recent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 878, 849 (2006)
(claiming that "uniformity cost is the central problem that intellectual property law must
manage," recognizing that "uniformity cost rises with the growing economic importance of, and
variation among, information-centric industries," and recommending copyright law sensitive to
the unique competitive environments in different industries).
163. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935, 1978 (1995) (book review) (critiquing Cass Sunstein's constitutional theory for
positing a "division between high and low culture-with the former seen as essential to the
repair of the system of democratic deliberation and the latter identified with mass culture and
particularly with the culture of television"). Though courts have given their imprimatur to a
number of copyright policies that have suppressed expression, they do so largely because the
copyright laws are facially neutral with respect to different kinds of expression.
164. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985)
('Trademarks help consumers to select goods. By identifying the source of the goods, they convey
valuable information to consumers at lower costs. Easily identified trademarks reduce the costs
consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more
competitive the market. A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher
quality products and to adhere to a consistent level of quality."), cited in Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law 36 n. 100 (U. Iowa Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 06-06, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=927996; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 168 ('The value of a trademark to the
firm that uses it to designate its brand is the saving in consumers' search costs made possible by
the information that the trademark conveys or embodies about the quality of the firm's brand.").
165. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW
AND POLICY 13 (2004) ("[H]istorically, in the United States, trademark protection has existed as
an important aspect of a larger body of law, namely unfair competition law: It is unfair
competition to pass off your goods as those of another producer by using a trademark confusingly
similar to that of the other producer."); accord., Diane Prods. v. Swan Cosmetic Research Labs.,
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with easily apprehended symbols indicating the provenance of the
goods and services they purchase. 166 Leading articles on trademark
law suggest that its primary purpose is to reduce consumers' "search
costs," to make it easier for them to find what they want.16 7 For
example, "Starbucks" as a mark for caf6s helps consumers navigate
the marketplace to find (or avoid) a known consumption experience.
Trademarks thus increase the salience of particular products and
services, elevating them above the run of things by associating them
with particular words, images, and prior experiences. 168  Like
trademarks, search engine results help consumers navigate through a
maze of digital data. They are "search cost reducers" par excellence,
Inc., No. 84 C 7383, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17173, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1985) (noting that the
court "urged defendant to consider prominent source designation on the front of its packaging" in
order to "avoid actual confusion or the likelihood of confusion" with competitor's product).
166. As Barnes explains,
According to conventional theory, when mark holders invest in trademarks,
they create goodwill that leads to greater profits from sales of their goods and
services. Mark holders invest in trademarks through maintaining consistent
quality and characteristics of their products and services and advertising
that informs consumers about their products qualities or, at least, informs
consumers about their products' availability. Consumers benefit because they
can rely on familiar marks to locate satisfactory goods and services.
Competition is enhanced because new entrants to a market can also invest in
trademarks that will attract new customers to the qualities and
characteristics of their own goods. Competition lowers prices. Everyone
benefits. Investing in and protecting the signals conveyed by trademarks
benefits suppliers and consumers.
David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks 1 n.1 (Seton Hall Public Law Research,
Paper No. 886045, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=886045.
167. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 777, 778 (2004); see also Ty Inc. v. Ruth Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510
(7th Cir. 2002) ('The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods. The
consumer who knows at a glance whose brand he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold
responsible if the brand disappoints and whose product to buy in the future if the brand
pleases."); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Trademark Defenses, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., forthcoming 2007).
168. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) ('In
economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by informing people that
trademarked products come from the same source. 'The benefit of the brand name is analogous to
that of designating individuals by last as well as first names, so that, instead of having to say
"the Geoffrey who teaches constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School-not the
one who teaches corporations," you can say "Geoffrey Stone, not Geoffrey Miller.'" (quoting
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. &
ECON. 265, 269 (1987)); Union Nat'l. Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat'l. Bank of Tex.,
Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) ('The idea is that trademarks are 'distinguishing'
features which lower consumer search costs and encourage higher quality production by
discouraging free-riders.") (also citing Landes & Posner)); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search.Costs, supra note 167, at 780-81.
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rapidly ordering a plethora of data to promote the discovery of URLs
related to one's inquiry.
The degree of similarity of marks and rankings emerges most
vividly in the way the prerogatives of search engines and trademark
holders have come into conflict in recent years. For example, search
engines want the right to display whatever their algorithms deem
most relevant in response to a given mark-including links to those
who compete against the mark's owner. 16 9 These disputes show how
trademarks and search rankings are coming to enter the same
cultural space-that of ordering an array of options for consumers. 170
Trademark law has long acknowledged the type of concerns
about information overload and attention scarcity that have driven the
analysis of categorizers' positive externalities (and content providers'
negative, overload externalities) in Sections A and B, supra.171 Marks
are designed to help consumers choose products and services. Marks
help consumers order experiences and learn via impressions of given
consumption experiences. Without them, it is easy to imagine being
overwhelmed by the array of options available-or simply foregoing
choice altogether.
In an era of information overload, attention, not information, is
the more pressingly scarce commodity. 72 Like travelers congesting a
169. See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27601, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2004) (Defendant claimed Google's sale of "adwords"
infringed on its trademarks by featuring competitor's websites prominently in response to search
queries like "American Blinds"); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d
816, 817 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (Plaintiff claimed that defendant bought trademarked terms on
various search engines so that when a user searched for plaintiffs trademarked terms, the
search engine would display defendant's result in front of, and in larger font than, plaintiffs);
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 950 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(Plaintiff complained that defendant, a registrar of Internet domain names, committed direct
and contributory infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution when it accepted
registration of Internet domain names similar or identical to plaintiffs service mark).
170. See Mark Bartholomew, Making a Mark in the Internet Economy: A Trademark
Analysis of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. L. REV 179, 181 (2005) (discussing the common
role of search queries and trademarks in helping consumers locate goods and services); see also
Misha Gregory Macaw, Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.: A Justification
for the Use of Trademarks as Keywords to Trigger Paid Advertising Placements in Internet
Search Engine Results, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that the use of
trademarks as keywords does not constitute trademark infringement so long as search engines
try to prevent consumer confusion).
171. Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731,
737-46 (2003).
172. RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION: STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE
AGE OF INFORMATION 7 (2006) ("What then is the new scarcity that economics seeks to describe?
It can only be the human attention needed to make sense of information."); Herbert A. Simon,
Designing Organizations for an Information.Rich World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1971) ("[A] wealth of information
creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the
173
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busy highway, a proliferation of goods can get in each other's way,
providing too many choices for a harried consumer to process. Marks
help ease the processing demands, reducing consumers' costs of
searching for the product they want. 173
Trademark law anticipates and mitigates the problem of
information overload by giving owners the right to control the marks
associated with their products. Mark owners can also sue to enjoin use
of marks substantially similar to their own, and some product
packaging (and even product design) that is too similar to the "trade
dress" of their products. Such broad protections serve to reduce the
noise with which counterfeiters and copiers can occlude the signal of
mark owners. In other words, the use of a mark as a source designator
is rivalrous; to the extent unauthorized producers appropriate the
mark, they reduce its potential to signal the provenance of the good it
marks. 174
At this point, the analogy between systematic protection for
trademarks and for categorization should be clearer. Both serve a
similar function by generating metadata structures that help us
organize experience. In so doing, these structures help us more easily
find what we need and grasp the import of signals that promote our
search. Both also respond to the problem of congestion. 175 In a world
overabundance of information sources that might consume it."), cited in Niva Elkin-Koren, Let
the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 179, 184 (2001).
173. Imagine, for instance, a world without trademark protection, where each producer's
marks were copied freely by competitors. Consumers could not easily recognize, by brand, the
source of the products they were consuming. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99
YALE L.J. 759, 762-63 (1990) ("[I]f a firm of good reputation tried to mark its goods with a symbol
to let consumers know them-that is, to lower the costs of search for consumers desiring to
purchase the firm's goods-other firms could imitate the symbol and trade on the first firm's
reputation."). They may well develop secondary authentication techniques, or other ways of
assuring that something marked as "Coca Cola" really came from the company that supplied the
last beverage they enjoyed with that label on it (such as always traveling to one "authorized
distributor" who could certify the source of the beverage). But all these alternative strategies
would likely increase the cost of finding what one is looking to buy.
174. See Barnes, supra note 166, at 8 ("Simultaneous use of a trademark by consumers
referring to a particular source of coffee is purely non-rivalrous and simultaneous use by
competing coffee suppliers in the same geographic market is purely rivalrous. Trademark law
permits unrestricted referential use. Infringement actions are directed at conflicting proprietary
uses of a mark, source-indicating uses by competitors.").
175. Congestion is a problem readily apprehended in physical space, with important
applications to scarce attentional resources. Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic
Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1481, 1488 (1980) (focusing on
the physical aspect of crowding as congestion). Indeed, scholars of copyright have begun
examining "congestion externalities," though they tend to focus on whether untrammeled use of
a particular work reduces its value. Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 117, at 474-75
("[J]ust as an absence of property rights in tangible property would lead to inefficiencies, so an
absence of copyright protection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because of
174
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where a quarter gigabyte of data is produced per person, per year,
what appears of far more value than sheer information are the filters
and maps we need to make sense of this deluge. 176 As Richard Lanham
says, the "new scarcity" is not that of information in general, but of
"human attention needed to make sense of information."' 177 Both
trademarks and categorizers help ease the burden of choosing between
an ever-increasing number of goods and services.
A skeptic might reply: If trademark law gives a mark's owner
control over the use of the mark, why shouldn't copyright law give a
copyright owner the right to control the metadata associated with his
or her works? 178 The flaw in reasoning here is to elide the distinction
between competing and referential uses in trademark. 179 Trademark
law largely prohibits the former, but provides robust protections for
the latter. Similarly, categorizers seek not to use parts of copyrighted
works to substitute for the works themselves, but to refer to them, like
the nominative uses protected by trademark law.180 The trademark
law gives these nominative uses favorable treatment at least in part
because they reduce consumers' search costs-they permit those
congestion externalities and because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and
exploiting these works."), with Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended
Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L. J. 1065, 1067-68 (2006) (arguing that the Landes and Posner
analysis on congestion externalities is "seriously flawed" because it overgeneralizes and ignores
the fact that "a downward shift in the demand curve for a product does not necessarily, or even
often, represent a loss in 'value' to society as opposed to a change in overall social preferences").
This Article focuses on whether works in general can create "congestion externalities" by
overtaxing users' ability to find what they need.
176. The quarter-gigabyte figure is based on LANHAM, supra note 172, at 258 ("Just as digital
storage is the only possible means of preserving the exabytes of information (an exabyte = a
billion gigabytes) being generated annually, so the competitive expression of the electronic screen
is the only way to express the larger struggle for attention.").
177. Id. at 7.
178. See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) ("Exclusivity promotes investments in goodwill because consumers interested in
quality can easily locate goods manufactured by quality producers and distinguish those of
competitors. Likewise, such exclusivity reduces the search costs of consumers, thereby raising
their welfare.").
179. See Barnes, supra note 166, at 8 ("Consumers would be confused by the simultaneous
use of the STARBUCKS mark by two unrelated coffee shops on the same block. But society also
benefits from unlimited referential use, to search for or refer to products from Starbucks U.S.
Brands. The [referential] information contained in a trademark, like the information disclosed in
a patent or revealed in a copyrighted expression, can be consumed non-rivalrously.").
180. The nominative use defense permits a party to use a trademark to refer to the
trademark holder. For example, the New Kids on the Block once sued USA Today to prevent the
newspaper from publishing a poll on band member popularity, "Who's the best on the block?" The
Ninth Circuit held that the newspaper was only using the mark (New Kids on the Block) to refer
to the band, not as an indication that the band had endorsed the poll or newspaper, or was the
ultimate source of the poll. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304,
308-09 (9th Cir. 1992).
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writing about or commenting on products quickly to identify the thing
to which they are referring. Similarly, the type of indexing and
commentary provided by commentary improves the marketplace of
ideas by increasing consumers' level of information about the
expressive works they are considering buying.
Trademark law is fundamentally a species of unfair
competition policy, a mode of regulating commercial relations among
competing offerors of similar products. In its role as an arbiter of
categorization processes, copyright law should not shy away from such
a function. 81 Just as John Wiley has observed the lessons patent law
can teach copyright law, some astute commentators have already
described the ways in which trademark theory can inform copyright
doctrine.18 2 As Gregory Lastowka observes, the Visual Artists' Rights
Act already protects rights of attribution (a form of source-
designation) for "original works by visual artists who produce single
works, limited edition prints, or sculptural casting in editions of less
than 200." Lastowka proposes extending that type of protection to
copyrighted works generally. 8 3 Laura Heymann asks us to "consider
trademark-like activity in ... the act of authorship," as she carefully
parses the types of information conveyed by metadata like names and
brands. 8 4  Each scholar's observations provide fresh ways of
understanding copyright-based regulation of categorization.
Overlapping trade secret, patent, copyright, and contract laws already
govern the protection of search engines' "secret sauce" of the
algorithms they use to generate results. Given the centrality of search
cost theory to so much of trademark law and theory, a combination of
principles drawn from both copyright and trademark might best guide
policymaking on the search processes that categorizers promote.
181. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 103 (2004) (discussing the
increasingly fine-grained role copyright law has in regulating a number of business practices).
182. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 137-
44 (1991); see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005)
(discussing the lessons of patent for copyright contributory infringement doctrine).
183. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1212,
1221 (2005).
184. Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2005).
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IV. OVERCOMING OVERLOAD
"Second order" approaches18 5 to overload externalities do not
attempt to reduce the amount of copyrightable expression, but rather
seek to create incentives for the production of metadata (via
categorization services, evaluators, and indexers) which make the
welter of extant information easier to navigate.18 6 Unfortunately,
would-be catalogers, archivists, arrangers and guides are often
menaced by a thicket of potential copyright claimants. Even if most
content owners appreciate the categorizers' service, holdouts tend to
demand licensing fees either for the initial, archival copy used to make
such compilations digitally searchable, or for results that include
portions of the copy as samples. The courts are divided on the merits
of such claims, and the cases often hinge on judges' ability to recognize
the ways in which unauthorized arrangement and organization of
copyrighted works may be essential to a thriving market in
information. 8 7 For instance, courts have affirmed fair use in the case
of internet archives of photos, but have resisted it in the case of an
interactive site using movie clips.' 88 The resulting legal uncertainty
has chilled many valuable categorization projects.
This Part suggests two legal routes for courts to begin giving
proper weight to the value of categorization services in copyright law.
First, categorization and indexing should join the list of especially
privileged uses recognized in case law. i8 9 Like reviewers and
185. As noted above, in the introduction and note 162, a "first order" solution to the problem
of information overload would involve a Pigouvian tax on expression. Given the normative
undesirability of such a tax, the "second order" solutions proposed here are designed not to deter
the creation of expression, but to create incentives for the type of expression (categorization) that
makes all other expression more useful and navigable.
186. Those fond of the problem of infinite regress might skeptically comment here on the
potential problem of too many metadata providers. Nevertheless, for reasons that become more
apparent in Part IV.A, I believe that metadata is less susceptible to the problem of information
overload than the expression it organizes and categorizes. Consider, for example, rival movie
review sites (such as Rotten Tomatoes (http://www.rottentomatoes.com) and the New York Times
film review archive). It is much easier to take in Rotten Tomatoes' snap statistical summary of
movie reviews (indicating that sixty-seven percent of 130 total reviews of Legally Blonde are
positive) or even the Times' snarky dismissal of the film than to watch the film itself. Rotten
Tomatoes, Critics Tomatometer for Legally Blonde: 67%, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/
legally. blonde/; A.O. Scott, Legally Blonde, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, http://movies2.nytimes.
com/gst/movies/movie.html?v.id=246684 (claiming the film "turns gooey when it should be
sharp").
187. See Madison, supra note 83, at 1640-41 (discussing the ability of courts to identify and
interpret such patterns, or "social practices").
188. See discussion infra Part I.B.
189. For an overview of how courts have treated various uses under the first factor, see
PATRY, supra note 68, at 419-504. Categorizing does not yet explicitly appear in this list, though
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educators, categorizers reduce negative externalities associated with
information overload. Law should not discourage this productive
activity.
Second, courts should begin treating aggressive litigation
against categorizers as a form of copyright misuse-an illicit effort to
leverage control over copyrighted works into secondary markets in
which monopoly market power is inappropriate. 190 Only robust fair
use and misuse defenses can adequately protect the Google Print
project, and categorizers generally, from harassing litigation.
A. The Value of Categorizers
Though many commentators appear to assume that copyright
law's chief purpose is to create more expression, its organization is
becoming increasingly important in an era of information overload.
Independent categorizers promise to play a vital role in taming
information overload externalities, if copyright law permits them to
archive, index, and sample copyrighted works.
The scope and creativity of categorizers is astonishing. Feel
depressed and only want to read good news? Try out "Mood News,"
which arrays headlines in order of "good, bad, and neutral."191 Want to
read fresh new political theory and perspectives on the academy? Try
meta-blog "Political Theory Daily Review," which posts dozens of
recommendations each day.192 Need to figure out which of your Beanie
Babies is a collectable and which can be safely donated to Goodwill? A
publisher has been generating several guides just for that purpose, as
well as picture books permitting a broader overview of the Beanie
Baby landscape. 193
Though each of these particular examples may seem hopelessly
specialized or trivial, the phenomenon of categorizing as a whole is
not. Consider, for example, the range of music categorizing sites.
it might be seen as a natural extension of preservation, abstracting, and research. See id. at xvi
(listing these as examples of fair use).
190. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 71 (examining the scope of potential, secondary
markets for copyrighted works).
191. Mood News, Mood News Summary, http://www.latedecember.comlsites/moodnews/
index.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). If Agence France-Press succeeds in its claim against
Google, arguing that headlines are copyrightable, such a service would probably be shut down
due to liability concerns.
192. Alfredo Perez, Political Theory Daily Review, http://politicaltheory.info/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2006).
193. See DENISE I. O'NEAL, FOR THE LOVE OF BEANIE BABIES 5 (1998) (discussing the thriving
beanie baby "secondary market").
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MySpace Music, 194 The N, 195 Yahoo! Music Engine,1 96 NPR,197 and
Amazon.com' 98 all permit users to comment on and rank musical
works. In the film arena, Rotten Tomatoes arranges snippets from a
cornucopia of movie reviews on pages devoted to nearly all recent
films.' 99 Blockbuster publicizes a list of "1001 Movies You Must See"20 0
as well as the American Film Institute's Top 100.201 Netflix, 20 2 IMDB,
and YMDB all offer users the chance to rate films, comment on them,
and comment on each other ratings and comments. 203  Both
Amazon.com and Powells.com offer similar services for books.
Given the breadth of such current categorizing services, it is
reasonable to wonder whether any legal intervention is necessary to
help this field at all. Is it not just as Robert Merges predicted back in
the 1990s; namely, that private parties are working out deals to best
promote and expose their content?20 4  Admittedly, some large
corporations have successfully brokered deals with content owners to
set up robust categorizing sites that feature bits of the content
presented. For example, Amazon's power as a retailer allowed it to
leverage "look inside the book" from publishers.205 But when we look
at the fate of some smaller players, the limitations of a laissez-faire
approach become clear.
194. MySpace.com, MySpace Music: Today's Top Artists, http://topartists.myspace.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=music.topBands (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
195. The N, Music Rankings, http://www.the.n.com/games/rank/index.php?topic=
183&v=-69170&theme=music (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
196. Yahoo!, Ask Yahoo! Music Help, http://help.yahoo.com/llus/yahoo/music/yme/
personalization/ personalization-45785.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
197. NPR, The Best Music of 2005 Countdown, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=5054194&sourceCode=gaw (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
198. Amazon.com: Rating Items, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/002-
0999018-0456820?ie=UTF8&nodeld=13316081#rate (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
199. Rotten Tomatoes, Frequently Asked Questions: Reviews, http://www.rottentomatoes.
com/ pages/faq#gathering (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
200. Blockbuster, 1001 Movies You Must See Before You Die Collections, http://www.
blockbuster.com/online/catalog/listDetails?listRef=100lMustSeeMovies (last visited Nov. 6,
2006).
201. Blockbuster, AFI Top Collections, http://www.blockbuster.com/online/catalog/
listDetails?listRef=afiTopMovies (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
202. Netflix Recommendations, http://www.netflix.com/Recs (last visited Feb. 6, 2006)
(subscription required).
203. YMDB: Your Movie Database, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
ymdb.com/faq/index_ukuk.html#question5 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
204. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295-96 (1996) (praising collecting
societies like ASCAP and BMI as models of private ordering).
205. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 86 (noting Amazon's digital archive of 120,000 books in
which "every page is viewable").
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The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse has documented many
cases of content owners bullying categorizers and commentators with
cease-and-desist letters. 20 6 The high cost of litigation deters many
categorizers from even trying to assert their fair use claims. As
Lawrence Lessig has said, given the uncertain state of the law, fair
use is often little more than "the right to hire a lawyer."20 7 Thus,
content owners may use expansive rights over derivative works to
assure that only "approved" partners have "full service" rating and
comment sites. For example, to assure comity between all players,
Amazon screens reviews and does not permit exceptionally cutting or
nasty criticism. 208 Ty, Inc., owner of the Beanie Babies trademark and
copyrights in these "sculptural works," has systematically tried to
suppress criticism of its products and business practices.20 9 And as
this Article has already documented, Google's legal troubles are
legion, in part because it refuses to play by the rules set by content
owners.
210
Ironically, Google itself may well be hurt in the long run if it
manages to succeed in its fair use defense against publishers, the
Author's Guild, and Agence France-Press. To the extent that these
cases establish a precedent of license-free sampling, they permit
lower-cost entry for competitors in the search market-as well as for
categorizers generally. In a world in which categorizers need licenses
for all the content they sample, only the wealthiest and most
established entities will be able to get the permissions necessary to
run a categorizing site. 211 Fair use for snippets of books, thumbnails of
206. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 74, at 36-41 (discussing several instances where
copyright holders' legal threats effectively vetoed apparent fair uses).
207. lessig blog, http://www.lessig.orgblog/archives/O01794.shtml (Mar. 20, 2004; 18:26
EST); see also Nimmer, supra note 74, at 280 ("Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard
rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that
the upshot would be the same.").
208. For documentation of this phenomenon in the case of one book, see Battle of the Bailey
Reviewers, http://www.tsroadmap.com/info/bailey-reviews.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
209. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
210. See Complaint at 2, The Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 20, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.comfhdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf; Complaint at 5, Agence France-Press v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:05cv00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with author), available at
http://blog.searchenginewatch.comlblog/050321-175410 (follow "Main Document (Complaint)"
hyperlink).
211. For a fuller exploration of the possibility of entrenched concentration here, see
Pasquale, supra note 18, at 129-30 ("[W]e cannot expect... a competitive market to arise
organically... [I]ndividuals... seek out the most comprehensive and authoritative source of
information, and the very fact that this occurs gives the leading source enormous leverage to
assure that information sources will want to appear (and be highly ranked) on its search
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images, and samples of audiovisual and musical works levels the
playing field.
Only a diverse and independent field of categorizing sites can
fully realize their promise of better mapping the information
environment. Categorizers help society overcome the "fragmentation"
and "colonization" of the "lifeworld," terms used by German social
theorist Jurgen Habermas to designate the negative consequences of
increasing specialization and inaccessibility of knowledge. 2 2 Fine art
and music will tend to become ever more disconnected from daily life if
a robust community of critics and commentators is unable to relate
them to those outside the often insular community of tastemakers.
Popular music improves as niches of thoughtful and independent
commentators evaluate and share the artists they enjoy.
In politics, the growing trend toward "narrowcasting" and
partisan media erodes the common public sphere of knowledge upon
which democratic dialogue depends. 213 As narrowcasting replaces
broadcasting, news aggregators like Google may well be the only news
source that adequately reflect the full range of opinions on what
constitutes news. Finally, categorizers "level" the information playing
field, letting outsiders understand the full range of expression
available. As proprietary information grows in importance, citizens
deserve at least a right to know what is available, even if its price
makes the expression in question unaffordable. 214
results.... The 'rich get richer' [dynamic can] mak[e] the search and rankings field a very
difficult one to enter.").
212. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 364 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981) (describing "the disintegration of life-relations when these are
separated, through legalized social intervention, from the consensual mechanisms that
coordinate action and are transferred over to [delinguistified steering] media such as power and
money").
213. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (describing potential negative
effects of narrowcasting); Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging
Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070 (2005) (asserting that
narrowcasting defies basic understandings of campaign finance law); Eben Moglen & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Soul of a New Political Machine: The Online, the Color Line and Electronic
Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1106 (2001) ("Broadcasting declines, narrowcasting is
in."). But see Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611, 663-65 (2005) (reviewing
SUNSTEIN, supra, and suggesting that he overstates the negative filtering effects of
narrowcasting).
214. Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman articulate this principle forcefully in their
analysis of search engine censorship. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Localized Google
search result exclusions: Statement of issues and call for data (Oct. 26, 2002), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google/ (discussing internet filtering).
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B. The Current Circuit Split on Categorizers
Despite their great promise, categorizers have suffered uneven
treatment from courts. The circuits are split on the issue of web
archives and categorizations, finding certain types of collections clear
fair uses and others infringing.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Arriba's search engine, now located at
www.ditto.com, permitted Internet users to find images by searching
its archives. 215 Kelly, a nature photographer, sued Arriba Soft for
including his images in its archive. 216 Arriba's website provided two
services: 1) lists of "thumbnail" visions of the images (reduced in size
and thus quality) and 2) framing of the full-size image (which
appeared on Arriba's website exactly as it had on its source page). The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the first use was fair, largely on the basis of
its "effect on the market" analysis. 217
The panel recognized that the plaintiffs images "are related to
several potential markets," including attracting internet users to
Kelly's own website (which sold digital and print versions of the
images and other materials), and being sold or licensed to other
websites or to a "stock database."218  Observing that Arriba's
thumbnail images actually directed users to Kelly's site, the panel
found no evidence that it reduced the value of his images as a type of
advertising for his site.219 The court also found that the "low
resolution" thumbnails in no way competed with the full size images
in markets for images. 220 However, since the full-size images Arriba
215. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2003).
216. For example, if one goes to Arriba Soft's website and types in "dog," the site provides at
least twelve "thumbnail" images of dogs, permitting the user to click on the source of each image
and thereby be directed to the website on which the dog image appears. Ditto,
http://www.ditto.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
217. It remanded the latter issue with instructions to the district court. Kelly, 336 F.3d at
822.
218. Id. at 821.
219. The panel's finding on the first factor (the purpose and character of the use) informed
its effect on the market analysis:
Arriba was neither using Kelly's images to directly promote its website nor trying to
profit by selling Kelly's images. Instead, Kelly's images were among thousands of
images in Arriba's search engine database. Because the use of Kelly's images was not
highly exploitative, the commercial nature of the use only slightly weighs against a
finding of fair use.
Id. at 818.
220. Id. Google is expected to rest a good deal of its fair use defense on an analogy of snippets
to thumbnails. Thumbnails are to pictures what snippets of text are to books (sentences are to
books). Books cannot be modified (useful yet not as valuable to user) by shrinking the size of text
(as thumbnails are just pictures reduced in size), but instead are reduced in form (length) by only
allowing the user/searcher to see a small applicable portion.
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made available did divert internet users from Kelly's website, and
effectively substituted for the images Kelly would have sold, the panel
was agnostic on the fairness of this use and ordered the district court
to consider more closely the economic effects of this type of
reproduction. 221 The Kelly panel's opinion offers a model of "fourth
factor" analysis that recognizes the complexity of economic effects of
unauthorized use.222
However, fourth factor analysis not only "giveth" to
categorizers, but also "taketh away." In Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena
Vista Home Entertainment, a company specializing in the business of
movie preview compilation and organization sold clips of movies,
without permission from the movie copyright holders, to retailers for
use on their websites.223 Users could not download the clips, but each
time a user viewed a clip on a retailer's website, the retailer paid a fee
to the movie preview company. 224 The copyright holders of the movies
claimed that the use of the clips constituted copyright infringement. 225
The district court sensitively addressed the "effect on the
market" factor accounting for both potential negative as well as
positive effects resulting from the unauthorized distribution of the
clips. 226 In addition, the trial judge found that the movie clips were not
substitutes for the copyrighted films 227 and recognized that the
221. The panel addressed the diverse markets for the photos involved. Id. at 821.
222. However, the vitality of that precedent was recently called into question when a district
court judge found Google liable for providing almost exactly the same image-search service at
issue in Kelly. The only significant difference in the two cases was that Google's antagonist, a
purveyor of erotic images, could demonstrate that it had licensed small-scale reproductions of its
images to a cell-phone company. See Xenia Kobylarz, Perfect 10 Racks Up Preliminary Injunction
Against Google, LAW.COM, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1140516320952;
Siva Vaidhyanathan, Thumbnails (and Google) in Danger, SIVACRACYNET, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/siva/archives/002827.html (noting that Google may be "inviting its
own death" if this case "forc[es] the courts to overturn Kelly [v. Arriba Soft]").
223. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328-29 (D.N.J.
2002), aff'd, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. There exists
the possibility that potential customers will be discouraged from purchasing or renting
certain videos due to the depiction of the movie as provided by Video Pipeline's clip
previews.... [and,] [m]oreover, the evidence that Video Pipeline's video previews are
low in quality.., also suggests that the market for purchasing or renting the
copyrighted motion pictures may be detrimentally affected.
Id. at 340. The district court also concluded that "Video Pipeline's service of providing online
previews to retailers' customers may also affect the marketability of the copyrighted motion
pictures due to the retailers' competition with ... [the copyright holder] in online sales." Id. at
341.
227. Id. at 341.
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contested site would increase exposure to the work. 228 Visitors to
retailers' websites, "who might otherwise be unaware of, or
unattracted to" the films, would have a chance to view clips. 229 These
determinations left the district court unconvinced by the plaintiffs'
assertions that the Video Pipeline service reduced the value of their
copyrighted works.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found in favor of Buena Vista
(a Disney subsidiary) by restricting the scope of the fourth factor
inquiry: "Because the issues pertaining to the potential harm to the
market for Disney's derivative trailers are more straightforward, we
focus our analysis on this area and do not review the District Court's"
consideration of the site's effect on the value of the underlying films.
230
The appellate court found (rather unsurprisingly) that Video
Pipeline's unauthorized use of the trailers denied the plaintiffs the
right to charge for that content.231 The appellate panel did not even
consider whether potential positive effects on sales or rentals of the
underlying movies might swamp these negative effects. 232
C. Directions for the Future
Arriba Soft and Video Pipeline create a circuit split on the
proper analysis of categorizers in a fair use "effect on the market"
analysis. In previous work, I have focused on resolving this split by
refining the fourth factor of the fair use test, proposing ways of
making the requisite judicial analysis more economically sophisticated
and more respectful of the legal methodology adopted in the landmark
Sony decision.233 I now argue that categorization projects are so
necessary to counteract the negative effects of information overload
that they deserve positive recognition in the first fair use factor, which
focuses on the "purpose or character of the use."234 Traditional
analysis of whether the use is commercial and transformative has
228. Id. ("While Video Pipeline's previews may attract customers to its retailers' websites
and lead to increased purchasing, as they submit, such purchases would most likely detract from
the sales of home videos on [the plaintiff's] official website.").
229. Id.
230. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 202.
231. Id. at 202-03.
232. See id.
233. See Pasquale, supra note 11; Pasquale, supra note 18. I still believe that detailed
inquiry into the actual effects of a use on the value of a copyrighted work is essential to applying
the statute. However, given that the cost of copyright litigation is one of the main impediments
to fair use, richer fourth-factor inquiry may ultimately prove not to be much help to defendants,
especially if they cannot afford the experts commonly necessary in such litigation.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
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extremely limited utility in the categorization context. Courts can
short-circuit these endlessly manipulable formal distinctions by
recognizing categorization as a per se pro-defendant finding in the
first fair use factor. That would not mean an automatic fair use
finding-there are, of course, three other factors to examine. But it
would at least provide some measure of judicial recognition of the
value of categorizers and indexers.
Next, in order to level the litigation playing field, I suggest that
aggressive efforts by content holders to shut down categorizing sites
should constitute a form of copyright misuse. 235 Developed from the
doctrine of patent misuse in the 1990s, the misuse defense may
reasonably balance Congress's recent expansion of copyright (and
paracopyright) protections. As an equitable defense, misuse doctrine
protects innovators in fields related to, but ultimately not directly
covered by, the legal rights of a copyright holder. Many content
owners have used aggressive litigation tactics not only to control the
use of their copyrighted material, but also to leverage that control into
veto power over any categorization project which samples their
work.236 Such aggressive tactics are exactly the type of inefficient and
unfair competitive tactics that misuse doctrine was designed to
combat.
1. Categorization as Privileged Fair Use
The moral and economic arguments for this position have
already been laid out in Section A, supra: Information overload is a
real problem and search engines do much to alleviate it. Yet these
arguments must find a basis in extant doctrinal analysis if they are to
convince courts. We can find such roots in a rather unlikely place: a
2002 dispute between the extraordinarily litigious stuffed animal
manufacturer, Ty, Inc., and a publisher of guides to Ty's "beanie baby"
products. 237 In this case, Ty, the owner of copyrights in various
"Beanie Babies" (stuffed animals copyrighted as "sculptural works")
235. As Jason Mazzone notes, 'The law's strong protections for copyrights are not balanced
by explicit protections for the public domain." Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1026, 1029 (2006) (recommending that Congress "should amend the Copyright Act to allow
private parties to bring civil causes of action for false copyright claims").
236. Such efforts also serve to dampen new, unauthorized commentary on works in order
(comparatively) to raise the profile of extant distribution and promotion networks. See Mark S.
Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 790 (2004) ("[P]rotection against unauthorized copying
provides dramatically disproportionate benefits to the most popular creations: it enables the
publishers seeking to create blockbusters to finance enormous promotional campaigns, which
drown out valuable, artistic creations that lack competitive marketing efforts.").
237. Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
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sued the publisher of books featuring images of Beanie Babies
(including a collector's guide and a "picture book" entitled For Love of
Beanie Babies). Ty would only license the right to use pictures of
Beanies to those who agreed to extremely restrictive licensing terms:
Ty does not like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it grants to those publishers
whom it is willing to allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors' guides reserve to Ty the
right to veto any text in the publishers' guides. It also forbids its licensees to reveal that
they are licensees of Ty. Ty's standard licensing agreement requires the licensee to print
on the title page and back cover of its publication the following misleading statement:
'This publication is not sponsored or endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty Inc. All
Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.
2 3 8
Ty's licensing terms throw into high relief the problem of the
"captured categorizer," an entity that may well have secured the
rights to catalog and comment on content, but only at the cost of
offering its sincere opinion on the same. Ty's terms rather insidiously
insisted that "house organs" themselves proclaim their independence
from the very group managing their content.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, Judge Posner
characterized For Love of Beanie Babies, a children's book whose
central appeal was amusing arrangements of particular "species" of
Beanie Babies into scenes, as "essentially just a collection of
photographs of Beanie Babies, and photographs of Beanie Babies are
derivative works from the copyrighted Beanie Babies themselves. ' 239
The categorizing work merited distinctly more favorable treatment:
PIL's Beanie Babies Collector's Guide... is a small paperback book with small print,
clearly oriented toward adult purchasers-indeed, as the title indicates, toward
collectors. Each page contains, besides a photograph of a Beanie Baby, the release date,
the retired date, the estimated value of the Beanie Baby, and other information relevant
to a collector, such as that "Spooky is the only Beanie ever to have carried his designer's
name," or that "Prance should be a member of the Beanie line for some time, so don't
panic and pay high secondary-market prices for her just because she's fairly new." 2 4 0
Judge Posner notes that Ty licensed the right to publish photos
of Beanie Babies only to authors of collectors' guides who promise not
to criticize Ty in their guides.2 41 This state of affairs indicates the
importance of independent categorizers; if all collector's guides are
licensed, consumers won't be able to trust whether they are getting
accurate information about the market or are simply being fed talking
points helpful to the interests of dominant producers. Melding first
and fourth factor fair use analysis, Judge Posner observes:
238. Id. at 520.
239. Id. at 519.
240. Id. at 519-20.
241. Id. at 520 ("Some of the text is quite critical, for example accusing Ty of frequent
trademark infringements.").
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Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that has become orthodox in
fair-use case law, we may say that copying that is complementary to the copyrighted
work (in the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that
is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs
or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use .... The
hammer manufacturer wants there to be an abundant supply of cheap nails, and
likewise publishers want their books reviewed and wouldn't want reviews inhibited and
degraded by a rule requiring the reviewer to obtain a copyright license from the
publisher if he wanted to quote from the book.
2 4 2
The existence of reviewing sites uncontrolled by the owners of
the material reviewed may be essential to the assurance of
trustworthy sources of information about such works. 243 Although Ty
focuses on reviews, 244 categorization and indexing may count as just as
socially useful a purpose, and may be the only effective way of keeping
track of materials to be reviewed (or reviews themselves). In an era of
information overload, there are many reasons to immunize the efforts
of those who give us a sense of "what's out there" from holdouts who
would make the task prohibitively expensive.
Fair use findings for snippets are also important to Google's
archiving project. In a series of cases involving software, courts have
protected users' rights to make an intermediate copy of a work in order
to reverse engineer its noncopyrightable elements-and to circumvent
technological measures designed to prevent such intermediate
copying.245 In other words, a software coder is entitled to make a copy
of a work in order to discover how it works, and then to replicate those
elements of it that are not copyrightable. The doctrine appears tailor-
made for the Google Library project, which intends not to provide full
copies of copyrighted works to searchers, but only small snippets of
242. Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citing Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (concurring opinion); Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175-76 (2d
Cir. 2001); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 90, at 1643 n.237).
243. See Nimmer, supra note 74, at 293.
244. Posner's analysis focuses not on the effect of the infringement on the defendant only,
but, more properly, on the consequences of a pro-plaintiff finding for the public sphere in general:
Quite apart from the impairment of freedom of expression that would result
from giving a copyright holder control over public criticism of his work, to
deem such quotation an infringement would greatly reduce the credibility of
book reviews, to the detriment of copyright owners as a group, though not to
the owners of copyright on the worst books. Book reviews would no longer
serve the reading public as a useful guide to which books to buy. Book
reviews that quote from ('copy') the books being reviewed increase the
demand for copyrighted works; to deem such copying infringement would
therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use doctrine permits such copying
Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 517.
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006) (addressing reverse engineering); Ganley, supra note 80
(advocating British adoption of an American-style intermediate use doctrine in order to
immunize actions like Google's).
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text deemed relevant to their queries. To the extent the snippets are
protected, the larger archiving project may be eligible for the
intermediate copying defense. 246 Given the accidental (and inevitable)
destruction of so much analog data over time, this digital archiving
project is of immense cultural importance. 247
Per se favorable first factor treatment for categorizers who
merely provide metadata and samples (and not copies of works
themselves) would do much to immunize the Google Library project,
as well as efforts to extend its coverage to music, films, and other
forms of expression. Currently, it is very easy for a court to give
inordinate power to holdouts unwilling merely to indicate their refusal
to be in the database to Google. 248 Per se favorable first-factor
treatment would not end the fair use analysis; there are still the three
other factors, and they can likely address the meritorious objections of
copyright holders.249  Yet a first factor analysis favorable to
categorizers and organizers would do much to dispel the fear,
uncertainty, and doubt that aggressive content owners have used to
chill legitimate fair uses over the past few decades. 250
246. See Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, PLAGIARY, Feb.
8, 2006, at 1, 7, available at http://www.plagiary.org/Google-Library-Project.pdf ("The owners
respond that the intermediate copying cases are distinguishable because they address a problem
specific to software: translation of the programs is the only means of accessing ideas unprotected
by copyright that are contained within the program. This problem, of course, does not exist with
books. Furthermore, in the intermediate copying cases, the software developer discarded the
translation once it developed its new non-infringing program. Google, conversely, will retain the
scanned copy in its search index. While acknowledging these factual differences, Google's
supporters stress the underlying principle of the intermediate copying cases: that copying may be
excused if it is necessary for a socially useful non-infringing end use.").
247. See Mary Sue Coleman, President, Univ. of Mich., Google, the Khmer Rouge and the
Public Good, Address to the Professional/Scholarly Publishing Division of the Association of
American Publishers (Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://www.
umich.edu/pres/speeches/060206google.html (discussing how disasters like Hurricane Katrina or
fascist regimes like the Khmer Rouge can wipe out all unique analog copies of works, and how
the Google digitization project is essential to preservation efforts).
248. As Lawrence Lessig has observed, such veto power would essentially keep about three
quarters of copyrighted works out of the database, because it is impossible to find the owners of
these orphan works. Joan Indiana Rigdon, Google, Books, and Fair Use, WASH. LAWYER, Mar.
2006, at 26.
249. These meritorious objections may include security considerations (copyright owners
worry about their industry being "Napsterized" if someone breaches the security of Google's or
the partnering libraries' digital copies of the works) and an overbroad "search engine" exception
(which would permit, for example, a "fanfic" site to digitally copy all versions of the work
ostensibly in order to let users find their favorite quotes, but really in order to let them download
and print works at will).
250. For examples of such overclaiming, see HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 74; Lydia Pallas
Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 495, 500 (2004) ("Even if a court
would not enforce these overreaching contractual terms as a matter of contract law, the use of
these type of provisions in ubiquitous shrinkwrap and cickwrap licenses has a certain in
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Admittedly, once such a privileging subfactor as categorization
is established, there will be more or less legitimate uses of it. It may
well be hard to define what precisely constitutes a categorizer in the
abstract. 251 However, such difficulties have not proven insuperable for
other "subfactors" in the first factor of fair use analysis, including
transformativeness and commerciality. Courts can distinguish
between highly transformative and less transformative uses, and
similarly can distinguish between paradigm cases of categorization
and less promising ones.252
For example, one reasonable development of the doctrine would
hold that a privilege for categorizers should be proportional to the
scope of works categorized and the openness of the categorization
project. A project premised on indexing and categorizing, say, all
Japanese films, would be a more privileged categorizer than, say, one
devoted only to indexing the films of Akira Kurosawa. In the latter
case, the relatively more easily found copyright holders should have
more of a claim to get some licensing revenues from the project than
the enormously dispersed owners of all Japanese films. Moreover, an
open categorization project is more of a public service than a narrowly
proprietary one. As copyright law develops, more such calibrations of
the categorization privilege may emerge.
terrorem effect on users."); William Patry & Richard Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in
the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1654 (2004) ("Copyright owners and their lawyers are
likely to continue advising would-be copiers that they are infringers even when the proposed
copy would be a fair use; and the copiers will be reluctant to provoke litigation over the issue.").
251. Similar issues have arisen in the context of exceptions targeted at museums and
archives. See ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL
IMPACT 138 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) (discussing efforts to "defin[e] libraries,
archives, museums, and galleries").
252. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) ("[Tlhe more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
189
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2. Misuse Defense
Intellectual property rights are, at their core, monopolies. 253
Even though legitimately attained, the rights are subject to abuse. A
copyright holder's efforts to leverage control over content into control
over a field uncovered by its derivative works rights can result in a
finding of copyright misuse (completely independently of any antitrust
liability).254 After such a finding, a content owner's copyrights are
invalid until the misuse is "purged."255 Although misuse findings have
not been common, they may prove a more effective shield for
categorization projects than fair use. While fair use doctrine is by
nature extraordinarily malleable and indeterminate, misuse presents
a relative straightforward assessment of whether copyright holders
(either alone or in concert) have attempted to strong-arm control over
given works into control over a whole other industry or field.
Several commentators have praised the development of the
misuse doctrine as a balance to copyright holders' overreaching. 25 6 Of
253. BRETT FRISCHMANN & DAN MOYLAN, CHAPTER ON COPYRIGHT MISUSE (forthcoming
2006); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 71, at 4 ("The Copyright Act accords to each copyright
owner a limited form of monopoly."). The doctrine of misuse arose in part out of concern about
sham litigation by copyright and patent holders designed to intimidate rivals into not exercising
rights that were legally theirs. Id. at § 13.09[A][1] (discussing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. vs.
Prof. Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989)). As Heins and Beckles have
demonstrated, the chilling effects of "weak IP claims" are legion. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note
74, at 33. See also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.coml
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=918871 ("Because liability is difficult to predict, intellectual
property users often seek licenses even when proceeding without one might be permissible. Yet
because the existence (vel non) of licensing markets plays a key role in determining the breadth
of rights, these seemingly sensible licensing decisions eventually feed back into doctrine; the
licensing itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use.").
254. Id. at 2; see also Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792-95 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding misuse where software copyright owner tried to prevent defendant from testing its
cards in conjunction with DSC's software, and thereby illicitly attempted to secure a monopoly
over uncopyrighted microprocessor cards); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121
F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding misuse in licensing agreement which plainly required the
Health Care Financing Administration to use the AMA's copyrighted coding system and no
other); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding misuse
where software copyright owner's licensing agreement sought to suppress any attempt by the
licensee to independently implement the software's idea); Scott A. Sher, Case Note, In re Napster
Inc. Copyright Litig.: Defining the Contours of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 18 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 325, 332-36 (2002) (discussing district court order indicating the
potential viability of Napster's misuse defense before it was bought by one of the companies
suing it).
255. NIMMER, supra note 71, at 2 (citing Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 n.22); see also Practice
Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 520 n.9.
256. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA. L. REV. 1095, 1133 (2003);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying The Leather.Winged Demons In The Night: Reforming Copyright
Owner Contracting With Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 497 (2004).
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all the defenses in copyright law, misuse appears ideally suited to
categorizers. To be reliable, categorizers should have the right to be
independent of the owners of the content they organize, comment on,
or review. They should not be subject to sanctions or reprisals from
large content owners angry at the categorizer's treatment of their
properties-be it a low ranking, a bad review, or a brusque
dismissal.257 Unfortunately, a recent categorizer case to address the
misuse defense directly, Video Pipeline, appeared to confuse it with a
more general First Amendment argument against excessive control
over copyrighted work.25 8 The Video Pipeline court conceded that
"anti-competitive licensing agreements may conflict with the purpose
behind a copyright's protection by depriving the public of the would-be
competitor's creativity."25 9 However, the court refused to find misuse,
holding that the defendant was free to criticize Disney films on
websites lacking Disney trailers.260 If the sole value of categorizing
sites were commentary, perhaps this crabbed view of the misuse
doctrine would be valid.261 But as Part III demonstrated, even
categorizers that offer the barest comment on copyrighted content
create value by sorting content. The misuse and fair use defenses
257. Circuit courts addressing potential misuses of copyright have also focused on the
illegitimacy of using copyright to expand a copyright holder's power over information that is not
covered the copyright. See, e.g., Assessment Techs. v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 646-47 (7th
Cir., 2003) ("To try by contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from revealing their
own data, especially when, as we have seen, the complete data are unavailable anywhere else,
might constitute copyright misuse. The doctrine of misuse 'prevents copyright holders from
leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the monopoly.'
(quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001))).
258. See FRISCHMANN & MOYLAN, supra note 253, for a comprehensive critique of Video
Pipeline.
259. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 342 F.3d at 204.
260. Id. at 206 ("The licensing agreements in this case do seek to restrict expression by
licensing the Disney trailers for use on the internet only so long as the web sites on which the
trailers will appear do not derogate Disney, the entertainment industry, etc. But we nonetheless
cannot conclude on this record that the agreements are likely to interfere with creative
expression to such a degree that they affect in any significant way the policy interest in
increasing the public store of creative activity. The licensing agreements do not, for instance,
interfere with the licensee's opportunity to express such criticism on other web sites or
elsewhere.").
261. Followed literally, Video Pipeline suggests that some courts will respect copyright
holders' demands to set up their own method of categorizing, providing samples of works, and
excluding others from entering this market. I believe such demands may be a kind of copyright
misuse (an illicit effort to leverage control over copyrighted works into control over other markets
which are not properly considered derivative works). See, e.g., Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale,
& Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music
Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 513 (2002) (discussing potentially anti-competitive
practices in the recording industry); Matt Richtel, Aggressive Strategy Brought on Inquiry of
Recording Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, § C, at 10 (discussing antitrust inquiry catalyzed
by RIAA's effort to dominate the online music retailing market).
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should not simply serve to facilitate more expression about extant
expression. They are also capable of protecting the independent
categorization and organization of copyrighted work.
From a strictly economic perspective, bargains between
categorizers and content owners may appear welfare-maximizing. 262
For example, Google's recent deal with the Associated Press enables it
to develop new content and provides a new revenue source for an
embattled old media stalwart. 263 Google has also started licensing
content from studios and sees such "deals as a key to long-term
growth."264 In the short run, such licensing practices may seem like an
ideal compromise between a categorizer and the owners of the content
it organizes.
However, traditional economic analysis does not take into
account adverse cultural consequences of categorizers dependent on
(or otherwise aligned with) the owners of categorized content.265 If
262. See, e.g., Posting of Douglas Lichtman to University of Chicago Faculty Blog,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2005/10/google-print.html#more (Oct. 4, 2005; 09:41
EST) (arguing for the "develop[ment of] a legal system that allows authors to share in that
revenue stream").
263. See Caroline McCarthy, Google Reveals Payment Deal with AP, CNET NEWS, Aug. 3,
2006, http://news.com.com/Google+reveals+payment+deal+with+AP/2100-1030_3-6102109.html
("On the surface, paying the Associated Press seems to conflict with the stance Google has
traditionally taken regarding its Google News service. Because Google News is an aggregator,
the company has argued, Google is not obliged to reimburse news outlets for linking to their
content. But Wednesday's announcement said the AP content will be the foundation for a new
product that will merely complement Google News. Thus Google maintains that the deal
supports its original stance on fair use.").
264. See Kevin J. Delany, Google Sees Content Deals as Key to Long-Term Growth, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 14, 2006, at Bi ("[Google] announced a deal to distribute video from Viacom Inc.'s MTV
Networks on the Web and a separate agreement with News Corp.'s Fox Interactive Media
division to provide it with search technology and broker advertising. Google has pledged $900
million in minimum payments to Fox under the tie-up.").
265. For an analysis of the cultural "blind spots" of economic analysis of intellectual
property, see Julie Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public
Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: INDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION
LAW 140 (Lucie Guibault and P. Bernt Hugenholtz, eds., 2006) ("Economic models of creativity
treat motivation as both exogenous and abstract ... blithely consign inspiration to the category
of 'fixed costs' (or, worse, assumed inputs) ... [and] lackj appropriate tools to study audience
response to creative works [so pervasively that] .... what remains most important is what the
models leave out."); Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions Blog, http:/!
www.concurringopinions.com/ archives/2006/10/net neutrality.html#more (Oct. 18, 2006, 15:58
EST) ("[W]e may want to avoid giving already-dominant entities even more opportunities to
leverage existing networks of distribution into an ever more powerful hold over our collective
imagination. Churches, schools, museums, indie musicians-all deserve as much of a shot at our
computers as iTunes, Disney, or Comcast."). Though my post addresses "net neutrality," there
are powerful analogs between "net neutrality" concerns and categorizer independence and
neutrality. See, e.g., Posting of James DeLong to IPCentral Weblog, http:/!
weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/2006/05/searchengine-n.html (May 22, 2006, 13:56 EST); Thomas
Hazlett, Google and the Myth of an Open Net, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at 15, available at
http://www.freepress.net/news/18236.
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Google and other large search engines are forced by adverse fair use
decisions to license content from copyright holders, we can easily
imagine deals between dominant content providers and dominant
categorizers that squeeze out smaller players in both fields.266 Just as
trademark law helps preserve a fair competitive playing field,
copyright law should avoid, whenever possible, enabling aggressive
leveraging that entrenches the dominance of large content providers
or renders categorizers mere subsidiaries of such copyright holders. 267
Strong fair use and misuse defenses for categorization are
essential to the reliability, objectivity, and diversity of the services
that help us navigate the maze of copyrightable expression. Like the
"licensed reviewers" whom Judge Posner mocks in Ty, licensed
categorizers may be overly inclined to praise their partners' work,
while ignoring the work of others (whatever its relevance or merits).
With little fear of a successful misuse defense, large content owners
like Disney can give "take it or leave it" ultimata to categorization
sites via license terms, forcing them to "say nothing but good" of the
content they index and comment on. Finally, if copyright becomes a
major barrier to entry in the categorization field, we can expect the
diversity of such sites to decline quickly. It is doubtful that any of
these outcomes would promote copyright's constitutional purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
Imagine a comprehensive source of data--one that included all
relevant material in a single index. With the advance of digitization
and interconnection, there are less and less technical obstacles to such
a "celestial jukebox," "new library of Alexandria," or consolidated
collection of all types of expression.268 As technology governed by
Moore's Law advances, storage and search costs continue to decline.
However, legal and business obstacles appear to arise as
quickly as technical barriers come down. Some of these obstacles may
be necessary to secure compensation to copyright holders and other
entrepreneurs. But the mere indexing and archiving of readily
available works-the core of categorization projects-has little if any
negative commercial impact on information creators. Holdouts should
266. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Madisonian.net Blog, http://madisonian.
net/archives/2006/08/16/googles.fight-and.flight-response (Aug. 16, 2006) (criticizing the
"licensing solution" to the struggle between categorizers and copyright holders); Posting of Frank
Pasquale to Madisonian.net Blog, http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/08/07/would-google-go-out-
of-business-without-fair-use (Aug. 7, 2006) (same).
267. For a prescient look at the dangers of such a regime, see Elkin-Koren, supra note 172, at
183-86 (2001) (discussing problematic consequences of concentration in the culture industry).
268. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 98.
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not be permitted to stop such projects in the same way that
permission culture has crippled innovation in the music and film
industries. 269
Giving content owners the right to control all mentions and
samples of their work conduces to the creation of a desert (albeit a
peaceful one) of self-serving and unreliable categorizers. A robust
information ecosystem depends on spontaneous creativity,
serendipitous appropriation, and accountable information sources-
precisely the type of positive developments that an untrammeled
market in "snippet licenses" appears less and less likely to provide.
The growing burden of information overload makes all the more
important a revision of fair use doctrine favoring independent
categorization, and a robust misuse defense designed to deter its
enemies.
269. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 74, at 25 (discussing several instances where copyright
holders' legal threats effectively vetoed apparent fair uses); see also PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER
JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 36-38 (2004) (discussing the negative consequences of "clearance
culture" for documentary makers without extensive corporate backing).
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